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Regional Politics *of* Southeast Asia

Contemporary Dynamism and Revisiting Indonesia's Role



Regional Politics of Southeast Asia

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Cerdas, Bahagia, Mulia, Lintas Generasi.

**REGIONAL POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA CONTEMPORARY DYNAMISM
AND REVISITING INDONESIA'S ROLE**

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FOREWORD

Assalamu'alaikum wr. wb.

In the name of Allah Swt., the beneficent and merciful. All praise is merely to Him, the lord of the worlds, for the gracious mercy and tremendous blessing that enabled Deepublish Publisher to publish a book entitled *Regional Politics of Southeast Asia Contemporary Dynamism and Revisiting Indonesia's Role*.

In efforts to educate and honor human rights by providing and utilizing science and technology to create a processing industry based on Indonesian natural resources, we published this book, which is expected to enrich the readers' knowledge and broaden their horizon.

This book focuses on understanding how concepts such as the norm life cycle, regional and global hegemons, middle power foreign policy, regional security complex, and conflict management can be effective in construing the contemporary dynamics in the Southeast Asian region.

We deeply hope that by reading and comprehending this book, readers can achieve their goals, and are able to develop a creative, innovative and independent mindset.

Our warmest gratitude to the authors of the book who has given attention, trust, and contribution to the perfection of this book. Hopefully this book is useful, educative, and contributive to the society, in the use of science and technology in the country in general.

Wassalamu'alaikum, wr. wb.

Best regards,

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INTRODUCTION

As a region of vast geopolitical and geo-economic interest to the world, Southeast Asia continues to rise as a major region of importance. This book attempts to implement basic international relations concepts to understand and fully grasp the continued dynamics in the region and further capture and comprehend Indonesia's contemporary role in the region. It focuses on understanding how concepts such as the norm life cycle, regional and global hegemony, middle power foreign policy, regional security complex, and conflict management can be effective in construing the contemporary dynamics in the Southeast Asian region.

The regional dynamics of Southeast Asia can fully be comprehended through an understanding of the historical context of the Southeast Asian region. This book starts by providing a historical context to Southeast Asia as a region and the importance of establishing the regional organization of the ASEAN to the regional dynamics of the region. The implementation of peaceful norms and non-interference is then traced and eventually linked to the contemporary implementation of the norms.

Following the first chapter is the argumentation on the strategies of Southeast Asian states in facing regional hegemony and global hegemony. This book attempts to capture the dynamics of extra-regional politics in Southeast Asia, with the inclusion of the East Asian connection, and how Southeast Asia has been able to

embrace great powers in the Southeast Asian region. But one of the surprising contemporary regional dynamics in Southeast Asia is the emerging presence of middle powers, including Australia, Japan, and India. They all have different interests in the region but have a common interest in establishing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The establishment of ASEAN's extra-regional forums attempts to capture those interests and prove that ASEAN centrality is still much relevant to the contemporary dynamics of regional politics in the region. The implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific not only captured the interests of emerging middle powers but also of traditional hegemons such as China and the US. It is critical to note the great power rivalries between the two states and how it has evolved from time to time. At the center of the contestation is Southeast Asia, and through this book, they have succeeded in responding to the challenge by the inclusion of those powers in a series of extra-regional forums constructed by ASEAN.

Security in Southeast Asia continues to become a major challenge for Southeast Asian states. This book argues that the issue of the South China Sea and non-traditional security threats, including those that occurred in Rohingya, Myanmar, has consistently divided the opinions and positions of Southeast Asian states. Both issues have effectively affected the conduct of foreign relations in Southeast Asia, despite the numerous efforts to find a resolve. Indonesia however, continues to show its leadership role in the region. We revisit this through discourses of conflict management and leadership in regional organization, as Indonesia is able to effectively manage the tensions in the South China Sea through pushing the agendas of confidence-measure building. Furthermore, in the case of the Rohingya people, Indonesia also continues to display its leadership through effective conduct of soft

diplomacy to help cater the needs of both the Myanmar government and the Rohingya people.

Written by: Darwis

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ABBREVIATION

AKIM	:	Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar
ASEAN	:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APT	:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Three
ARF	:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum
ACFTA	:	Association of Southeast Asian Nations -China Free Trade Area
BAKAMLA	:	Indonesian Maritime Security Agency
BRI	:	Belt Road Initiative
CMLV	:	Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam
COC	:	Code of Conduct for the South China Seas
DOC	:	Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Seas
EAS	:	East Asian Summit
EEZ	:	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	:	European Union
FDI	:	Foreign Direct Investment
OIC	:	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
SEANWFZ	:	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty
TAC	:	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN	:	United Nations
UNCLOS	:	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US	:	United States of America
ZOPFAN	:	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

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Chapter I

SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A REGION

In contemporary times, it is simple to position South East Asia as a center of contentious global politics (Rüland, 2005a). The region used to be one that is peaceful, but recent tensions of great power politics in the region have led to an increasing amount of efforts to contain the conflictual dynamics that have occurred (Goh, 2007). The issue with the South China Sea, involving almost half of the countries in Southeast Asia, to issues of non-traditional securities is persistent in the discourse of Southeast Asian studies. This section elaborates on how Southeast Asia became a region after the process of regionalism that has occurred. The second section of this chapter deals with the process of regionalism that has occurred in Southeast Asia.

1.1. The making of 'Southeast Asia'

In its current form, Southeast Asia consists of eleven states, all with unique sets of diversities that make them different from one another. Southeast Asia is unique in itself. Differing itself from other regional areas in the globe, Southeast Asia consists of a number of states that are ethnically different from one another (Acharya, 2009; Emmerson, 1984). In total, the eleven states located in Southeast Asia include Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Unlike other regional areas such

as Europe and Africa, the eleven states located in Southeast Asia do not have a variable that connects each of the countries all together (Putra, 2022a; Susilowati et al., 2018). African Union, for example, consists of states that are regionally located in Africa and are easily integrated due to the similarities of color and race among the peoples of the member states.

Southeast Asia had to be constructively made. Several Southeast Asian states share the same history of being colonized by a Western state during the times of the 20th and 19th centuries. Several of the colonial powers that showed interest in Southeast Asia include England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, which showed initial interest during the periods of the 16th century. At first, most of these colonial powers showed interest due to the presence of certain goods and commodities, including natural resources, located in Southeast Asia. But the reality is that states in the Southeast Asian region embraced different ideologies, which has led to different governmental and political systems adopted in Southeast Asia.

Traces of early regionalism, as will be elaborated on in the following section, only came to the surface amid the process of regionalism that occurred in the mid-20th century (Bryar & Naupa, 2017; Oba, 2019). The presence of global and regional hegemonies in the Southeast Asian region fueled the intention of establishing regional organizations that could assist in facing the uncertainties of global and regional hegemonies in the region (ASEAN, 2020c, 2021b). The Cold War that occurred marked the start of an intensification of relations among Southeast Asian states, which eventually became the driving factor of the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

As a region, Southeast Asia faced unprecedented threats during the bipolar system that occurred during the Cold War (Anwar, 2012). Unfortunately, Southeast Asia faced a series of threats from regional hegemony, each pushing Southeast Asian states to side with a country and resent the opponent. They made efforts to alter the ideological thoughts of Southeast Asian leaders. Systemic factors to foreign policy were well evident during these times and became a major issue to regional order in Southeast Asia.

After the establishment of ASEAN and the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia constructed itself as one of the most well-developed regions in the world. Southeast Asia is known to be a region of strategic interest. The initial wordings that utilized the terminology of Southeast Asia initially occurred when England the US established the 'Southeast Asia Command,' or commonly known as 'American Southeast Asia Command' during the Pacific War of 1943 (Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Emmerson, 2005). With time, Southeast Asia was slowly captured as a strategic region for states in the contemporary times.

1.2. Understanding Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The process of regionalism in Southeast Asia did not occur naturally, as it was the result of a constructed process involving state stakeholders in Southeast Asia. Considering the issue of the Cold War that occurred in the mid of the 20th century, states in Southeast Asia discussed possible measures on how to properly respond to the ongoing crisis that has directly affected the stability of Southeast Asia. The establishment of ASEAN consolidated the process of regionalism in the region, as with the agreement to ratify the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The heads of states of ASEAN signed

this agreement as a form of support to establish legitimacy for ASEAN as a source of the rule of order (ASEAN, 2003; Limsiritong, 2018).

The initial times of Southeast Asian regionalism occurred on 8 August 1967. During this time, representatives of five countries, including Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, established the 'Bangkok Declaration' for the establishment of ASEAN. Through time, since the establishment of ASEAN, regional integration has intensified in Southeast Asia. In comprehending the process of the ASEAN establishment, it is pivotal to look back at how the Cold War affected Southeast Asian states. They viewed that the future projection of regional stability in Southeast Asia is only of anarchy and will negatively impact Southeast Asian states. That sense of threat approaching led the states of Southeast Asia to unite and intensify efforts to respond to the growing strategic interests of global powers in Southeast Asia. They announced that the areas of Southeast Asia would not be affected by the Cold War due to their neutral stance on the matter (Arendshorst, 2009). This, of course, will only hold for several years, as the Cold War eventually affected many states in Southeast Asia.

The process of regionalism did not stop only in to the five founding states of ASEAN. Regionalism in Southeast Asia continued to also affect the decision-making of the other states located in Southeast Asia (Bangun, 2018; Kanchana & Unesaki, 2015). The first is Brunei Darussalam, which officially became a member of ASEAN on 7 January 1984 through the Ministerial meeting in Jakarta. Brunei Darussalam is a small country located on a direct border with Indonesia. Following Brunei for membership in ASEAN is Vietnam, officially becoming a member on 29-30 July 1995 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Furthermore, Laos

and Myanmar became the eighth and ninth official members of ASEAN. Last is Cambodia, which officially became a member of ASEAN on 30 April 1999. A major debate in Southeast Asian discourse is the position of East Timor as a prospective member state of ASEAN. With the membership of Cambodia in ASEAN, the dreams of the founding fathers of ASEAN for a fully inclusive regional organization have been fulfilled. The membership of all states in Southeast Asia shows that the ten nations are not geographically close but also share similar norms in the conduct of regional relations.

As of the current status quo, East Timor is eligible to be a member of ASEAN, however, the regional politics have not allowed the country to become a member due to several considerations (Simpson, 2006). Nevertheless, East Timor still plays a pivotal role in the regional dynamics of the South Pacific.

After the establishment of ASEAN and after the progression of new member states inside ASEAN, a number of key documents were introduced. What makes ASEAN unique in its process of regionalism is the norms introduced to be internalized by members involve a series of policies that force member states inside and those neighboring Southeast Asia to follow certain norms that have been agreed upon. After the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, it was able to agree upon the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971.

The background story of ZOPFAN relates directly to why ASEAN was built in the first place. The founding members of ASEAN agreed that the presence of the Cold War could undermine the stability of Southeast Asia. They needed a regional mechanism that could be respected by the conflicting hegemons, so the conduct of foreign relations in Southeast Asia could remain peaceful. But

this was not enough because, in order to declare a region to be peaceful, it had to implement a specific agreement that could cater to those needs. ASEAN decided to introduce ZOPFAN with the aim of showing that Southeast Asia is a region full of peaceful conduct in global affairs. ZOPFAN's main feature is to show to any state that wants to interact with Southeast Asia that this region is free of external pressures and neutral in its conduct of foreign affairs (Emmerson, 2005). This was pivotal as middle powers such as those in Southeast Asia faced this dilemma of how should they proceed in their conduct of foreign affairs amid the presence of alliance-based relations (Gordon, 1966).

Through ZOPFAN, ASEAN showed the world that despite being less significant during that time in global affairs, they were willing to introduce such a bold stance amid the presence of the Cold War. It showed that ASEAN member states no longer are abided by the norms of their colonials, nor by the emerging powers in the form of the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

An important dynamic that should be highlighted pertaining to regionalism in Southeast Asia and ZOPFAN is the introduction of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). Despite publicly embracing a stance of neutrality and peace, Southeast Asian states, at least several of them, eventually fell into war and into the hands of an alliance (Anthony, 2005). Nevertheless, it did not make ASEAN stop in its tracks, as they proceeded to implement other relevant treaties deemed necessary to be able to achieve a peaceful region in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2010; Collins, 2008). SEANWFZ addresses the concern that several member states of ASEAN are key allies to either the Soviet Union or United States, therefore, ASEAN embraced the stance of not allowing the presence of any nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia.

SEANWFZ was agreed upon on 15 December 1995 and was implemented starting in 1997.

But the argument made in this book is that Southeast Asia initially became a solid regional force when they faced external threats in the form of the Cold War issue (Connelly, 2015; Putra, 2021a). Since the establishment of regionalism in Southeast Asia through ASEAN, the emergence of great powers in the region has not halted. Throughout time, we are all witnessing the rise of new regional hegemony such as China, which continues to exert its economic and political power in the Southeast Asian region in contemporary times (Putra, 2020a). Furthermore, we see that the United States is slowly regaining the trust of Southeast Asian states through its policy of 'Pivot to Asia.' But the complexity in the International politics of Southeast Asia is the rise of other middle powers that have different intentions in the region. India is a major global power in the 21st century that continues to excel in its relations with Southeast Asian states (Agustiyanti, 2018; Chacko & Willis, 2018). Japan is also a long-time significant actor in Southeast Asia, which continues to focus on economic investments and opportunities for Southeast Asian states (ASEAN, 2020b).

In regards to the economic integration of Southeast Asia, the region shows great prominence for the future times to come. Historically, Southeast Asian states have agreed to undergo preferential trading agreements, even to the level of free-trade areas. In this sense, it is also important to note that throughout history, they have also been able to negotiate a free trade agreement with China and have concluded an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement. This policy makes the process of export-import and general services trade become of ease, due to the loosened restrictions of trade (Dapice, 2015; Rüländ, 2016). All states in

Southeast Asia are participants of the trade agreement, with special preferences given to CMLV states (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam).

But the economic integration that took place in contemporary times is due to several regional financial issues faced in the past. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, ASEAN invested more time in ensuring the financial stability of its member states despite the tragic implications faced after the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN intensified its efforts to establish economic confidence among its member states through the establishment of several key agreements (Acharya, 2014; Hew, 2007). Among them include the 2003 'ASEAN Concord II,' which aims to establish the grounds for an ASEAN Community.

This is where the discourse of regional integration differs between Southeast Asia and other regional areas such as Europe and Africa. Southeast Asia focuses on solidifying its regionalism in the form of a community, unlike a union such as that in the EU (European Union). As can be seen, after the ASEAN Summit of 2003, member states of ASEAN established a system in which the organization of ASEAN itself is able to solidify the notion of Southeast Asia as a community through the establishment of the ASEAN Community (Acharya, 2009; Ravichandran & Benny, 2013). As can be seen, ASEAN Community consists of three major pillars, including ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Political-Security Community, and 'ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.' There were initial rejections for the ASEAN Political-Security Community, as this was viewed as more invasive toward the national sovereignty of ASEAN member states (Drajat, 2018). It is critical to keep in mind that ASEAN upholds unique principles in its day-to-day conduct. It ensures that the domestic issues of member states are not

intervened by ASEAN and its member states (Benny et al., 2014). Furthermore, it upholds the mechanism of unanimity, which means that all states must agree on a proposal in order for it to be implemented by ASEAN.

It is worthy to note that the ASEAN Political-Security Community emphasizes the intensification of cooperation among member states of ASEAN in dealing with both traditional and non-traditional security threats (ASEAN, 2009). It is in no way focused on undermining the sovereignty, nor forcing certain global norms to be implemented by member states of ASEAN. Therefore, despite initial debate on its acceptance, the ASEAN Community continued to embrace its political security pillar as an integral part of establishing the ASEAN Community. This process of establishing an ASEAN Community shows Southeast Asia's consistency in integrating the region through peaceful means of regionalism.

A major challenge to the process of regional integration in Southeast Asia is the process of establishing deeper regional integrative measures for its member states. In order to solidify partnership and regionalism, it was a must for ASEAN to establish a charter that is accommodative to ASEAN's short-term and long-term regional ambitions (Guido & Kamarulnizam, 2011; Putra et al., 2019). The ASEAN Charter consists of several key principles and norms that must be abided to by member states of ASEAN (Putra, 2015b). Among them include a rule-based order, consensus in making decisions, appreciation towards sovereignty, and non-intervention. In its initial introduction, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter gained massive criticism from human rights activists. As there are no wordings used in the ASEAN Charter that state that human rights abuses will be fought and responded to by ASEAN. This is a difficult choice in the process of regionalism, as

regionalism forces state actors to abide to the norm adopted by member states, but without neglecting the relevant global norms that may be relevant in that case. Despite so, the ASEAN Charter since 2005 stands strong and serves as the basis of conduct in ASEAN.

The agreed ASEAN Charter consists of several unique points that show that the process of regionalism in Southeast Asia is indeed essentially unique. For the principles adopted under the ASEAN Charter, the charter states that member states of ASEAN must respect the independence and sovereignty of member states of ASEAN. There also exists a collective responsibility in the upholding and realization of peace in the region, and the need for member states to be consistent in facing aggression and threats of non-peaceful conduct in Southeast Asia (Putra, 2015a). Such a statement also means that ASEAN member states are pushed to implement peaceful means of settling issues that may arise due to traditional and non-traditional security threats (York, 2015). The main decision-making body in ASEAN is its ASEAN Summit, in which all state leaders meet to decide pressing matters to the contemporary dynamics of ASEAN. This also includes any decisions to accept or decline the proposal of a new member of ASEAN, which, if linked with the past assumptions made by the author, is a major problem for its membership.

As a conclusion, the regional politics of Southeast Asia cannot be compared to that which occurred in other parts of the world. European Union initially became a coal and steel community before its status now as one of the most well-established regional union in the world. For Southeast Asia, the eleven states located in this area consists of different backgrounds, ethnicity, language, and history. Some were colonized, and some stood as strong kingdoms, which

still is relevant in today's world. The process of regional integration is a pivotal topic to understanding the general dynamic of regional politics in Southeast Asia, as it bridges other concerns of the book, which relates to why Southeast Asia implements several strategies compared to others. Based on this chapter, readers now understand that Southeast Asia contains a rich and unique regionalism history related to the Cold War. It was the presence of global hegemony in Southeast Asia that helped fuel the intentions of Southeast Asian states to establish what we now know as ASEAN. A major key indicator of Southeast Asian regionalism is the establishment of peaceful norms that states in the region must abide by.

But the process of regionalism in Southeast Asia is not only inward, as it is also outward. Means, the introduced norms will be relevant for both Southeast Asian states, as well as states located near Southeast Asia that wishes to interact with the region. This topic will be deeply investigated in the following chapter on extra-regional politics in Southeast Asia.

Chapter II

EXTRA-REGIONAL POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As stated in the previous chapter, this section focuses on the extra-regional aspect of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Each regional organization is different from one another. It is pivotal to highlight a trend that relates directly to Southeast Asian affairs, in which Southeast Asia tends to be a place that is filled with the process of norm internalization for both Southeast Asian member states and for states that wish to interact with Southeast Asia through ASEAN. This section explores the regional political dynamics of the East Asian connection that colors most of the regional politics of Southeast Asian interaction with neighboring states, as well as how Southeast Asia has been able to embrace the presence of major global powers through ASEAN.

2.1. The East Asian Connection

As can be seen, the process of regionalism in Southeast Asia, through ASEAN's internal mechanisms, ASEAN is considered well conducted in regional affairs. But the uniqueness of Southeast Asia's regionalism lies in its capacity to attract regional actors outside of Southeast Asia to also be included in the numerous regional norms (Rattanasevee, 2014). In the study of International Relations, Finnemore and Sikkink provided compelling analysis on "norm internalization," in which they describe how the process of a

norm is initially constructed, and to the final stage, internalized by member states (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This norm life-cycle makes a compelling analysis if fitted to the study case of ASEAN and the establishment of its extra-regional connections beyond Southeast Asia.

It is worth noting that the primary system adopted by ASEAN is that it implements a certain norm to be implemented by its member states. So, the first stage is to ensure that all member states implement the newly introduced norm to become the normality in relations in Southeast Asia (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In several instances, this norm internalization may face initial criticism that must be responded to by ASEAN, considering its policy of consensus decision-making (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011). Furthermore, in internalizing economic-based norms, it will usually take more time for CMLV states to be able to adapt to the new norm introduced. Nevertheless, there still exists high expectations for all member states to eventually adopt the newly introduced norms.

The following context in the norm life-cycle for ASEAN is the introduction of the norm to be implemented by extra-regional actors that wish to interact with the Southeast Asian states. This could be any state, starting from global and regional hegemons such as China and the US, or middle powers such as India and Japan (Mearsheimer, 2001). Nevertheless, this entails that any external states that wish to conduct foreign affairs with Southeast Asian states must abide by the rules present in the region. This has already been adopted through the introduction of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) introduced in 1976. TAC was constructed by ASEAN during the Cold War to further declare that Southeast Asia is a region of peace and does not welcome any acts of aggression in the region (Putra, 2020b). It is implemented for

both Southeast Asian states (regional affairs), and for international actors that wish to interact with Southeast Asian states. The key here is that Southeast Asia is willing to open its doors to extra-regional actors as long as the intention is to establish peaceful relations and cooperation only (Putra, 2017).

Now in understanding the East Asian connection to Southeast Asia, it is firstly pivotal to define what states fall under the category of East Asia. In the context of partnership with Southeast Asia, the countries that fall under this category include Japan, China, and South Korea. North Korea has been involved in a number of talks in the past, but as a member of an extra-regional forum conducted by ASEAN, not as a partnering member in trade such as the other countries in East Asia.

In understanding the regional politics of Southeast Asia, we can first take a deeper look at the dynamics of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). APT was initially formed in December 1999, and is a partnership group including all ten members of ASEAN, plus the countries located in East Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea) (Leifer, 1989). The background to the formation of the APT relates to the fact that Southeast Asia is a direct neighbor of East Asia, and most of the Southeast Asian states have close bilateral relations with all three, or one of the countries located in East Asia (ASEAN, 2021c; Lim & Cooper, 2015). Therefore, it was a natural political maneuver for Southeast Asia to establish an extra-regional forum involving members of ASEAN plus the countries in East Asia.

A major background worth noting that solidified the need to establish the APT is the Asian financial crisis. The Asian financial crisis caused massive destruction to the economies of Southeast Asia. The region and the globe in a sense needed to establish a financial system that is stable, to stay far from what previously

happened in the region (Ross, 2006; Suehiro, 2017). Through the APT, one of the original intentions of the member states was to move on the same and synched path, in order to not repeat the drastic implications of a financial crisis.

Initially, talks on this NPT took place in an informal ASEAN Summit, which included ASEAN and Japan, China, and South Korea. Informally, they talked about possibly establishing an extra-regional forum that would member the 13 countries, focusing on several identified fields of partnership (He, 2019). This whole process started since 1997, and in 1998, through the East Asian Vision Group, they were able to conclude the fields of partnership that will be focused on for the extra-regional forum.

The APT was then formally established in December 1999, when the heads of states of ASEAN and the three partnering states issued a formal agreement in the Philippines. The statement consisted of the objectives, principles and the way forward for this extra-regional forum. Several of the fields include economic, social, politics, and other fields deemed necessary in the near and distant future. The APT since 2007 has thus successfully operated as a project for ASEAN in its conduct of international politics and extra-regionalism. A form of regionalism that does not only limit the cooperation within the scope of the regional area, but beyond that. We can now see how most of the Southeast Asian states have engaged in fruitful relations with East Asia, especially in the fields of security, trade and investment, finance, tourism, forestry, education, and other essential fields.

ASEAN's East Asia connection can be better understood as a central agenda-setting role. Here, despite undergoing intensive cooperation with more dominant actors in East Asia, ASEAN built its confidence to be able to drive the way for regional cooperation

by establishing extra-regional forums in its favor (Sukma, 2012; Thies & Sari, 2018). ASEAN wants to become the actor that introduces new norms and sets new agendas for the wider Asian region (Khoo, 2010). This is critical, as will be elaborated later on, the rise of traditional and non-traditional security threats in the 21st century makes ASEAN's position as an agenda setter a pivotal role in regional politics.

Besides the presence of ASEAN's extra-regional forum with East Asian states, it is also important to note that it has recently intensified relations with the East Asian states individually. All of the members of the APT have strong ties individually with Southeast Asian states. China for example has enjoyed a strong bilateral relation with ASEAN since 1991, where the relations between ASEAN and China were initially formed. The formal bond between ASEAN and China was in 2003, in which the states agreed to establish a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity (Negara & Suryadinata, 2019). As stated in the previous chapter, a major feature of the relations between China and ASEAN can be seen in the introduction of the ACFTA in 2002 (Suehiro, 2017). This form of free trade agreement has since become one of the most significant agreements concluded in the history of Southeast Asian regional politics.

2.2. Embracing Great Powers in Southeast Asia

Returning back to the discussion on embracing great powers in Southeast Asia, one phenomenon that highlights the regional politics of Southeast Asia is how they have embraced the world's greatest powers into the system of ASEAN. As stated in the previous section, the presence of TAC gave the insight into how

ASEAN will operate in the future times to come. TAC as of 2021 was ratified by the US in 2009, and by China in 2003. Each reader of this book may have differing views on how significant are international laws for the actual conduct of international relations. Nevertheless, to be able to have the agreement of global powers such as those both, reflects a unique dynamic in the regional politics of Southeast Asia.

It is pivotal to remember that ratification of the TAC is significant on many fronts. It shows that states embrace mutual respect for independence and the value of sovereignty. Furthermore, it entails that all states in the Southeast Asian region are free from external interference, a value also embraced in the ASEAN Charter. It also echoes the need for a peaceful settlement of occurring disputes in the region, and to avoid any use of force. Those that criticize ASEAN usually refer to it as a big organization that is lacking of any force powers. But this is where the dynamics of regional politics in Southeast Asia occur. Southeast Asia's regional politics is marked by an optimistic-based perspective, conducted through negotiation and inclusion of external actors into a series of peaceful extra-regional forums established by ASEAN. Never in its conduct and in its charter that ASEAN intends to establish regional peace or become a major global power in world affairs.

Embracing the idea of great powers in Southeast Asia, great powers here are defined as the US and China, both of which have shown great interest in engaging in the regional affairs of Southeast Asia (Pattiradjawane & Soebagjo, 2015). But it is also important to note that several emerging and traditional middle powers are also present in the context of ASEAN's countries of interest. This list includes the previously mentioned Japan, India, Australia, and

Canada. And of course, we also have the presence of the Russian Federation, which still shows that it should be considered as a major power in global affairs. All of these countries have shown strong interest in engaging in regional affairs with Southeast Asian nations and ASEAN as a whole.

In order to facilitate the diverse opinions and intentions of both great and middle powers that wish to interact with Southeast Asian nations, the regional political dynamics here are continued inclusion in the ASEAN-centralized systems of norms. Back to Finnemore and Sikkink's point, this is a process of norm internalization for extra-regional actors of Southeast Asia. In this sense, this process includes ensuring that these extra-regional powers are willing to engage in Southeast Asia but still consider the existing norms that apply in the region. This has already been evident with TAC but will continue to be tested in other instances in this book.

Southeast Asia is a unique region filled with unique dynamics in the field of politics and security. Many scholars have written on the topic of the volatility and assertiveness of states in the Indo-Pacific region (Medcalf, 2019; Ortagus, 2019; Saha, 2018; Scott, 2019; Tan, 2020; Tertia & Perwita, 2018). These dynamics should not be taken lightly, considering that Southeast Asia is at the center of the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, the current solution introduced by ASEAN includes measures similar to that of the APT, which includes a series of inclusion of those global and regional powers to its webs of extra-regional forums (Choong, 2019; Kausikan, 2018).

One of the extra-regional forums dedicated to facilitating the aforementioned dynamics is the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS). Based on its membership, the EAS consists of states that are more diverse, and exceeds the region of East Asia. Unlike

the APT, EAS consists of several middle powers and global hegemony in the form of the US, Russia, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the three countries of East Asia (ASEAN, 2020d). A major consideration as to why ASEAN established EAS concerns the uncertainties of the region (Putra & Cangara, 2022). Due to the Indo-Pacific being seen as a volatile region, many policymakers in Southeast Asia eventually thought of establishing a forum in which all states that have a strong voice in the region can talk with one another and start discussing the future projections of the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, this forum is aligned with ASEAN's vision as a regional organization, which is to help construct the regional architecture, politically and security-wise, of the Indo-Pacific region. The idea of establishing EAS was started by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mr. Abdullah, which discussed about opportunities of expanding the network of ASEAN to those states that have a strong voice in the Asia-Pacific region. The initial debate surfaced on the topic of which states should be invited to take part in the EAS, considering all East Asian states have already been facilitated in the APT forum (MOEA India, 2018; Wuthnow, 2019).

Besides the issue of membership, another issue that surfaced is the politics related to possible western values introduced in the forum. Unlike the APT, the EAS consists of several states that are highly regarded for its capacity to introduce the liberal world order. Some among them champion certain levels of human rights values and systems of government, which may prove challenging for Southeast Asia. This may be a problem for states such as Myanmar, which has been continuously criticized by Western states for its poor human rights records, and inconsistency of democratic systems implemented (Guilloux, 2010; Haacke, 2009; Putra, 2022b). This concern continues to rise, as, in many sessions of EAS, there

will always be criticism from Western states. Nevertheless, this is what makes the regional politics of Southeast Asia so unique. The ability of ASEAN to include states such as the US and Australia in the extra-regional forum of ASEAN means that those states must abide by the rules and norms introduced by ASEAN itself. One of the most pressing norms that must be upheld is the respect for sovereignty and to stay clear of the internal affairs of other states.

Another unique regional political dynamic in EAS also concerns Russia's membership to EAS. Initially, Russia participated in EAS in 2005 as an observer, fulfilling the invitation of Malaysia. After formally proposing to become a member of EAS, Russia and the US needed to show to ASEAN that they were willing to negotiate on good terms under EAS and to avoid traditional diplomatic tensions, which usually surface in forums such as the UN Security Council (Rosyidin, 2016). Russia officially became a member of EAS but has shown that the negotiations and discussions are more complex due to the differing and diverse national interests that are evident.

Observing the success of APT and EAS as extra-regional forums of ASEAN, ASEAN decided to expand this prospect by establishing a new and inclusive extra-regional forum known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The APT has successfully attracted the East Asian states to be embedded into the series of regional norms upheld by ASEAN, and the EAS has been able to introduce Southeast Asian-relevant norms for global powers (Leifer, 1996). Despite so, ASEAN still believes that they need a forum that can accommodate different regions in the ASEAN norm system, more specifically, it seeks to include countries located in Europe, South Pacific, and South Asia. One of the key reasons for this relates back to the formation of the EAS, in which it is projected that the region

of Asia-Pacific is still unpredictable and full of possible political and security issues. Therefore, it was pivotal to adopt a measure that could be more inclusive to possible actors in the Asia-Pacific region (ASEAN, 2020a, 2021a).

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was thus formed to answer this concern. The potential of conflicts and instability in the Asia Pacific was too high to not be regarded. Southeast Asia consisting of middle and small states, embraced this concern and decided to establish an extra-regional forum that would be more inclusive for its membership (Bagus et al., 2015). The ARF was formed in 1994 and currently consists of 27 countries, including the ten ASEAN member states, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, New Zealand, European Union, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh, Australia, and Sri Lanka. As can be seen, the geographical diversity is well fulfilled, consisting of states in the Americas, Europe, the Pacific, and South Asia. These are all geographical areas that are defined by ASEAN as key areas of interest and interact with Southeast Asian countries on a day-to-day basis (Agastia & Perwita, 2015). It is thus this forum that aims to construct the regional architecture of Asia-Pacific by focusing discussions on political and security issues of the region. Nevertheless, it is still worthy to note that Southeast Asian values of non-interference are still well upheld, despite the fact that the agendas of the ARF may seem to fall under the category of sensitive for several of the member states.

In understanding the position of ARF in the regional politics of Southeast Asia, we need to first understand what visions do the ARF embrace in their conducts of regional affairs. First of all, the ARF is aimed to develop dialogue and construct consultations on political and security issues that are of importance to member

states. Secondly, the ARF is pushed to positively contribute to efforts of confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. These are critical points to remember, considering that the membership of ARF itself consists of states that are well-known for their unique foreign policy conduct, which often time has caused regional disruptions.

Let us take for example, discussions on North Korea. As a member of ARF, North Korea has in several times been discussed in the forum, pertaining to their development of nuclear weapons and illegal conduct of nuclear weapons testing. It is again important to recall that the ARF is a consultative forum, a forum where all state members have the equal rights to talk on critical matters that affect the political and security dynamics of the Asia Pacific. As a result, despite being discussed in the ARF, North Korea has utilized this platform to further discussions on their points of view on why they engage in such rebellious forms of foreign policy. A critical aspect of conflict management is to be able to understand the perspective of North Korea rather than to hear the voices of its opposers.

The values upheld by ARF are a manifestation of what Southeast Asian regional politics is all about. The peaceful engagement under the spirits of confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution (DAVIES, 2012; Haacke, 2003). The regional politics of Southeast Asia embraces the concerns of emerging political and security issues in Southeast Asia and beyond and views that they have the limited capacity to contribute to alleviating the issue.

This section primarily focuses on the norms that Southeast Asian states wish to implement beyond the region. Analyzed under the lens of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle, we can easily conclude that Southeast Asian states through ASEAN have

successfully internalized norms of non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and confidence-building measures for states that wish to engage in foreign relations with Southeast Asia. The formation of the APT for example echoes the importance of East Asia for Southeast Asian affairs. Furthermore, it is the intention of ASEAN to include great and middle powers under the network of ASEAN's extra-regional forums, so that all states are willing to engage in regional affairs in Southeast Asia must abide by the rules and norms set by Southeast Asian states.

Chapter III

DYNAMIC NATIONAL INTERESTS TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA

The ASEAN-centered extra-regional forums represent one of the vital dynamics that can be seen in the context of the regional politics of Southeast Asia. In addition to this, it may be seen by readers of this book that the inclusion of great powers, such as the US, Russia, and China, as well as emerging middle powers such as India, Japan, and Australia, begs the question of why. Out of all of the strategic regions in the world, why is it that there seems to be a growing interest of considerable powers to Southeast Asia? As seen in past chapters, Southeast Asia contains an immense amount of potential and natural resources. Nevertheless, this section attempts to clarify why Southeast Asia continues to become a center of attention for emerging powers and even becoming the center stage of great power rivalries.

3.1. *Great Power Rivalries*

Before diving deep into understanding the presence of great power rivalries in the Indo-Pacific region, it is pivotal to first understand the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region. As the title of this book shows, a certain dynamic environment is planned to be caught in the narrative that this book introduces. The terminology of the Indo-Pacific is considered an emerging discourse

in the study of international relations. Academics have expressed rising concern about the uncertainties of the future for the Indo-Pacific region due to the presence of an overwhelming number of powers, which in many cases have acted out of the spirit of coerciveness and assertiveness.

The Indo-Pacific region is a vast area, including the littoral states of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Therefore, any discourses discussing dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region most likely focus on dynamics in the region that affect one or several littoral states to the Indian or Pacific oceans. In addition to this, academics have well focused on this discourse because of the rising traditional and non-traditional security threats that have arisen throughout time (ASEAN, 2019; Medcalf, 2019). A considerable dynamic worth noting is the traditional security threat of the South China Sea, which includes half of the member states of ASEAN, as well as the rise of non-traditional security threats such as piracy, human trafficking, and illicit drug trafficking. These rising concerns should not be taken lightly, as due to the presence of the traditional and non-traditional security threats, external actors such as the US have shown great interest in the region. As of now, the most dominant discourse in the regional politics of Southeast Asia pertains to the presence of considerable global powers in the contestation of great power rivalries in Southeast Asia, which relates directly to the overall stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

Readers of this book may be familiar with the liberal world order of the US. In its conduct of foreign policy, the US has been well known to disseminate values of liberalism, which in many cases, have been rejected by state actors. This is evident in the tragic cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, which are arguably studied cases of great humanitarian crisis despite the initial peaceful intent of the US

(Hinnebusch, 2007; Roe, 2008). Nevertheless, the US's role in the Asian region, including Southeast Asia, is to reactivate its past foreign policies. During the early 21st century, the US was highly occupied with the two wars it initiated in the Middle East. Therefore, it was not able to be active in the conduct of foreign policy in distanced areas including in the Southeast Asian region. In contemporary times, the US embraces the national interest of establishing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Now, this may sound justifiable for proponents of International law and UNCLOS, but it goes in direct confrontation with the beliefs of China (Acharya, 2018; Medeiros, 2005).

Since the early 21st century, China has implemented a radical policy of claiming the South China Seas. This policy goes an indirect violation of the UNCLOS, meaning it goes in direct confrontation with the EEZ claims of Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and to a small extent, Indonesia's North Natuna Seas. This point will be elaborated on in detail in the upcoming chapters, but this small introduction is surfaced to better understand the stance of the US in Southeast Asian affairs.

In an attempt to implement its free and open Indo-Pacific region, the US has attempted to conduct naval exercises and regular patrols in waters it claims as to the high seas. This is where tensions have often arisen between China and the US, specifically in the waters of the South China Sea. Whereas China upholds the notion that those waters are part of China's territorial waters, the US continues to intrude on the waters as they embrace a different version of international laws (David Tweed, n.d.; Storey, 2014; Suehiro, 2017). The problem here is that the South China Sea is in Southeast Asia's backyard. It goes on a direct border with Southeast

Asian states, therefore, any form of hostilities that occurs will affect the stability of Southeast Asian states. As Barry Buzan and Ole Waever elaborates in the *Regional Security Complex*, the issue of the South China Sea seems to have now also included the states of Southeast Asia, whether intended or not (Buzan et al., 1998).

Besides the US interest at sea, the US is also a major proponent of human rights activism in Southeast Asia (Davies, 2013; Ryu & Ortuoste, 2014). As stated in the previous chapter, the US is active in several extra-regional forums of ASEAN, including the ARF, EAS, and bilateral ties with most of the Southeast Asian states. The US aims to maintain support for the establishment of democratic institutions and the proliferation of human rights values in the Southeast Asian nations. However, this is a task proven to be of equal difficulty to its liberal intentions in the Middle East (O'Sullivan, 2017). Southeast Asian states are sensitive to external interferences. They would often cite the ASEAN Charter in order to justify the gross violations of human rights that its oppressors regularly conduct. Therefore, it has been a difficult journey for the US to implement those values, considering the principles adopted in Southeast Asia. And this basically marks a strong point in the regional politics of Southeast Asia, in which despite the growing presence of great power politics in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian states have been able to be immune from any forces due to the fundamental principles that it upholds (Christie, 1995; Lee, 2011; Simon, 2007).

Despite so, with recent tensions growing in Myanmar related to its poor democratic institutions and prosecutions of minorities, it has been difficult for Southeast Asian states to put a blind eye on all of the dynamics. The prosecutions of ethnic minorities in Myanmar have attracted mass public interest and condemnation (Kingston,

2015). The US is also at the center of this issue by advocating the protection of human rights. This dynamic will again become a major issue for years to come in the context of the regional political dynamics of Southeast Asia.

Now returning back to the past discussion of the US foreign policy history in the Southeast Asian region, it is worth noting that this policy was adopted during the Obama administration. He came into power by introducing the rhetoric that he is a different leader from his predecessors, that he is willing to re-emphasize the US interests in Asia and better the relations with the Muslim world. Obama that time, viewed Southeast Asia as the center of the Asia-Pacific region, therefore, a considerable important region when he introduced the rhetoric of the US pivot to Asia (Dibb, 2017; Oba, 2019). It is thus the interest of the US to embrace Southeast Asia so that they can together establish a rules-based order for the Asian Pacific region (Acharya, 2003).

The US has fully dived into Southeast Asia's extra-regional forums. As can be seen since 2009, the US ratified the TAC, one of the essential diplomatic documents for both Southeast Asian states and ASEAN as a regional organization. Furthermore, Obama was the first US president to attend EAS in 2011. It is worth noting that this book views Obama's conduct of foreign policy in Southeast Asia as significant, considering that past presidents of the US seemed to only implement rhetoric that Southeast Asia is important, without the proper backup of relevant foreign policies to Southeast Asia (Haacke, 2003; Kim et al., 2017). It was since this time that Southeast Asia felt secure, as the presence of a global hegemon brought about great economic opportunities for Southeast Asian states, different from the Cold War time, which brought continued instabilities and conflict.

A pivotal feature of the regional politics of Southeast Asia in relation to the presence of the US in the region is that they have partnered in addressing the most pressing issues of global affairs (Simon, 2012; Syailendra, 2017). Both actors have continued to pledge to cooperate with one another to address climate change by intensifying cooperation on low-carbon economic growth methods. The US is also one of Southeast Asia's most strategic partners in sustainable development strategies, whether it be in the context of mitigating the impacts of climate change or enhancing humanitarian assistance due to climate change-related natural disasters in Southeast Asia. The US has always been a vocal proponent of addressing human security issues globally, and Southeast Asia is also included as a target.

Nevertheless, in relation to the regional politics of Southeast Asia, as well as the great power contestation in the region, the US and Southeast Asia have been strategically converged on the issue of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. The US has echoed its support over the regional architecture built, centered by the presence of ASEAN. The US has continued to support ASEAN by its commitment to attending and becoming active in the extra-regional forums conducted by ASEAN and continued to be vocal about the need to implement a rules-based order for the Indo-Pacific region (Fravel, 2011). Just a year ago, ASEAN implemented what is known as the 'ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,' which shares similar values to that embraced by the US for the conduct of foreign affairs in the Indo-Pacific region (Anwar, 2020). This strategic convergence on many issues, including on how to view the Indo-Pacific region, is where the contestation of great powers lies most at. The values adopted by the US and ASEAN have, in many

ways, irritated China, as the values of China and ASEAN on this matter do not converge.

Now at the center of great power politics in Southeast Asia is China, a rising great power that has sought influence and dominance over Southeast Asian states since the early 21st century. China has, and will always be a natural ally of the Southeast Asian states (Callahan, 2016; Chen et al., 2014). Based on its geographical location, it directly borders Southeast Asian states both on land and at sea. China has implemented a unique foreign policy with which it does not discriminate against whom it conducts its foreign and economic relations with. In the past and present times, China has always been criticized for its continuous support of North Korea, which should speak volumes about China's indiscriminate foreign policy. In the context of Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian states are far from a perfect human rights record based on Western definitions. Nevertheless, China has never commented on the human rights issues that have occurred in Southeast Asia. Despite human rights violations against minorities and weak democratic government institutions, China continues its trade relations with Myanmar. And it has done so in areas that have historical issues with its democracy, including Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia.

Such analysis is the basis of why this book argues that China's foreign policy is indiscriminate, so regardless of the human rights and democratic situation of that country, China will keep its foreign engagements. Despite so, it is worth noting early in this section on China in Southeast Asia that China is currently playing a dangerous game, of undergoing intensive trade relations with Southeast Asian states, but also confronting them in the context of the South China Sea (Blazevic, 2012; Yan, 2010). Since the introduction of the Nine-

Dash Line, China has implemented a policy filled with assertiveness and aggression in defending its claims in the South China Seas. It has even come to an extent in which China is currently reclaiming islands in the Paracly and Spratlys Islands, also areas claimed by the Philippines as its EEZ, and adding military equipment and infrastructures to the reclaimed lands (Singh & Yamamoto, 2017; Yu, 2016). This is an alarming issue, as will be discussed approaching the end of this book, China has come into direct confrontation with countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This is of course a concerning issue, considering that the aforementioned states also are strong allies of China in the economic realm.

But the power politics represents a convoluted series of events in the South China Sea. As mentioned earlier, China and the US have been in direct confrontation in the South China. Seas. That is why this sub-chapter is stated as the great power rivalries in the South East Asian areas. But they do not only challenge one another in the context of the South China Sea, but in a general 'influence contestation,' in which both China and the US have been and are currently scrambling in Southeast Asia to win influence over a number of realms (Putra, 2020b; Yahuda, 2013).

As stated previously, the US has been close with many of its allies in the Southeast Asian region. However, it is China that has maintained closer economic ties with member states of ASEAN. As the US thus has focused on areas of defense for its basis of cooperation with Southeast Asia, it is China that sweeps Southeast Asia in the context of trade and infrastructure (CIMB, 2018; Zhou & Esteban, 2018). For starters, China has been ambitious in expanding its market since 2003. In doing so, both China and ASEAN member states have agreed to implement a free trade agreement, which

would ease export-import conduct among ASEAN and China. Besides the CMLV states that are given more time to adapt to the measures, it is evidently clear that China's attempt to win the hearts of Southeast Asian states starts from the provision of economic opportunities to Southeast Asia.

As the tensions between China and the US continue, including with the recent trade wars that have transpired, China's relations with Southeast Asia seemed to have no negative impact from it. Southeast Asian states, therefore, are not choosing with whom they will side in this great power rivalry, as they are playing a safe game of balancing their interests with both the US and China. Nevertheless, the engagement of the US is incomparable to that of China. Throughout the years, it has been China that has had a long-term economic roadmap for the region of Southeast Asia. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has proven to become a source of great investment and infrastructural development opportunities for states in Southeast Asia (Shumei, 2018; Xue, 2016). So, despite the issues that they have in regard to the South China Sea, China is still confident that Southeast Asian states will not abandon the economic opportunities present in the form of the BRI. Southeast Asia thus is less interested in talks about human rights, freedom, openness, and things of that nature, but more towards materialistic needs as rising middle powers of the world.

Despite the optimistic turns of events in Chinese and Southeast Asian relations, members of ASEAN have not forgotten about the uncertainties that a rising regional hegemon such as China will impact the geopolitical dynamic of the Southeast Asian region. Since the pandemic, China continues to diversify its relations with Southeast Asian states, through the intensification of Chinese trade, infrastructure development opportunities, and the

provision of vaccine access. But it is worth noting that China has always been present in the region, whether it being in the extra-regional forums of APT, ARF, and ASEAN or the bilateral engagements with individual members of Southeast Asia.

The regional politics of China and Southeast Asian states is not as simple as it seems. But one thing that can be assured is the intense cooperation in the field of economics as a priority area of cooperation for ASEAN and China (Aoyama, 2016). Linking back to the previously mentioned free trade agreement, we can clearly see that the elimination of tariffs has even reached the commodities of agriculture. This should not be viewed lightly, as the main production commodity for Southeast Asian states is in the field of agriculture, and by them allowing the negotiations of the free trade agreement to include the fields of agriculture, there is thus high hopes for Southeast Asian states to adapt to the market based on the preferences of China. Besides free trade in the field of numerous commodities between China and Southeast Asia, both stakeholders have also agreed to undergo an agreement on trade in services, which was initially signed in 2007. But the steady and consistent progress in the ASEAN and China economic relations never faded away, as it continued to intensify and expand the forms and fields of economic relations in 2013 (Bo, 2017). During this time, they agreed to expand the list of commodities and the coverage of the agreement.

Now it could be argued that there is nothing special with the free trade agreement between China and ASEAN. Several of the key allies of ASEAN, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia, have all come into the progression of also finalizing free trade agreements with ASEAN or with individual Southeast Asian states. But the statistics of the overall economic relations between ASEAN

and China should speak volumes. China is currently the largest trading partner for ASEAN (CAEXPO, 2017). This status has not only risen in recent years but has been evident since 2009. The trade between China and ASEAN has even doubled since 2010, with increases in annual rates since the introduction of the numerous economic agreements between the parties (CAEXPO, 2017). Besides that, thanks to the introduced BRI that directly affects many Southeast Asian states, the FDI of China to ASEAN reached approximately USD 9 billion in 2019. Therefore, to conclude, China is not only a significant economic partner for ASEAN, but it is the most important economic partner for ASEAN.

As can be seen in the context of great power politics in Southeast Asia, both the US and China hold strong importance for ASEAN and ASEAN members individually. Despite having tensions on several issues, such as human rights advocacy for the US, and the South China Tensions for China, they both have continued to exert its influence to win sympathy and support from South East Asia. This is indeed a unique set of circumstances, as it shows that the great power contestations will only benefit Southeast Asia in the long run. China, for example, in order to neutralize the repercussions of its South China Sea claims, needs to intensify the availability of FDIs and infrastructural development for South East Asian states. The US also will seek opportunities, for example, by establishing a long-term economic plan for Southeast Asia in order to balance the capacities of China in the region.

3.2. Emerging Middle Powers

In the midst of the great power contestation in Southeast Asia, a considerable dynamic should not be neglected. As Holbraad elaborates in his 1971 work on the role of middle powers, there now exists a number of emerging middle powers in global affairs

(Holbraad, 1984). What used to only be Australia and Canada during the Cold War now has expanded to include emerging middle powers in the form of Japan, India, and Australia. It is by coincidence that all of the three mentioned states are located in Asia and are on direct borders with Southeast Asia. Therefore, this section would not be complete if it did not include the interaction of emerging middle powers in Southeast Asia, especially in the form of what interactions have been evident throughout the years. This book views it as critical, considering the fact that in future times, the presence of those middle powers may be deemed more critical compared to the contemporary presence of the great power rivalries between the US and China.

We first have a look at Japan and how they have interacted with the regional politics of Southeast Asia. From the outset, Japan has a complicated set of relations with Southeast Asian states. Japan pacifistic foreign policy in World War II put Japan in a complicated position to engage in relations with its neighboring states. Nevertheless, as time passed, Southeast Asian states and states in Asia, in general, have adopted a cooperative stance with Japan, allowing for greater economic relations in contemporary times. Drawing from history, the relations between ASEAN and Japan started in the 1970s, in when ASEAN member states viewed Japan as a potential ally amid the presence of the Cold War in the region. Several fields of cooperation intended include in politics and security, economics, and socio-cultural cooperation. Japan also followed the intentions of Southeast Asian states to establish a peaceful region that is free from external pressure. They decided to sign the TAC in 2004, further showing their initiative to engage with Southeast Asian states. Upon a series of ASEAN and Japan summits, the Summit in 2011 marked a great leap in partnership

prospects between the two stakeholders. ASEAN and Japan decided to intensify their relations by concluding the ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (ASEAN, 2020b, 2021d; Emmerson, 2005).

In contemporary times, the interest between Japan and Southeast Asian states converges in a number of fields. First of all, from a geopolitical stance, Japan is also wary of the developments in the Indo-Pacific region (Valencia, 2018). Same as the US and ASEAN, Japan perceives that the region may result in a certain level of coerciveness among states located in the region or by states that wish to steer up the geopolitical structure of the Indo-Pacific. In alignment with the stance of the US, Japan thus is committed to establishing an outlook on the Indo-Pacific that facilitates Japan's interest in the region being inclusive, open, and adhering to a rule-based region. Japan thus showed great support to Japan when ASEAN concluded the Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Japan, including the instance of concluding the outlook, has always expressed its deep support for ASEAN centrality, and is happy to advance the vast partnerships in the field of maritime cooperation, connectivity, and economy. In regards to the Indo-Pacific region, besides echoing the need for an open area, Japan is more focused on cooperating with Southeast Asia in the fields of sustainable development goals and addressing climate change (ASEAN, 2020b). Japan believes that what ASEAN is doing in the Indo-Pacific region is introducing a sense of togetherness and cooperation, which will eventually become more critical than the high politics that have occurred in recent years. Another contemporary dynamic of Japan in the regional political dynamic of Southeast Asia is the issue of countermeasures against the pandemic. Japan has been willing to

provide intensive financial aid to Southeast Asian states in an attempt to advance public health in Southeast Asia.

But as a middle power, Japan is also vocal on several key security issues that have arisen in the region. Japan has stated that Japan and Southeast Asia share common interests in security, especially with the rise of traditional and non-traditional security threats that have occurred in the region. In alignment with the concerns of the US, Japan is also vocal on the issue of the South China Seas. Despite not being a claimant state of the issue, Japan is still a big proponent of an open, free, and peaceful Indo-Pacific area. This also includes the areas of the South China Seas, which it echoes the importance of freedom of navigation. It has always stressed ASEAN concerns, including the need to adhere to the rule of law.

Another security issue that Japan is critical of is the situation in North Korea. ASEAN itself has, in several instances through the ARF, addressed the issue of nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons development in North Korea (Rüland, 2005b). Despite being a consultative forum for all stakeholders, Japan has also been vocal through this extra-regional forum to press North Korea and demand an explanation for its coercive actions. Japan has always stated that what North Korea is doing is a violation of International law and directly threatens the livelihood of the Japanese people. The tendency of the regional politics in Southeast Asia has been supportive of Japan's harsh rhetoric, as it impacts key allies in East Asia, and may just undermine the security of the greater Asian region. Another pressing matter is the issue of Myanmar and the violations of human rights that have continuously taken place. Japan is among the states that have been in a certain degree aligned to ASEAN's stance, but also has been more vocal considering the no

limitations that it is bound to in regards to protesting an ASEAN member.

To conclude the security threats faced, we can observe that the security threats faced by Japan are the same as that faced by the Southeast Asian states. As their interests converge, it is thus pivotal to outline the general partnerships that these two actors have undergone, especially in the context of political security and economics.

In order to strategically converge the interests of Japan and Southeast Asian states, under the context of the regional politics of Southeast Asia, Japan has been much involved in all ASEAN facilitated forums. ASEAN and Japan continue to enjoy intensive dialogue relations through bilateral summits and extra-regional forums such as the APT, EAS, and ARF. In the case of the ARF, for example, Japan has become a member since 1994 and has helped carve the geopolitical architecture of the ARF to better its capacity to respond to security crisis that occurs in the region.

In the realm of economics, the regional conduct of Japan in Southeast Asia has been filled with intensive cooperation. It is all proven by the two-way trade between Japan and ASEAN, which is among the top 10 in the world (ASEAN, 2020b). The number of FDI's that flows into ASEAN is also significant in comparison to other dialogue partners of ASEAN. But the bulk of economic relations can be defined by the signed ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership signed in 2008, which outlines the basis of economic partnership between ASEAN and Japan, specifically in the context of services trade and investments.

Another middle power that should be recognized in the context of regional politics in Southeast Asia is the presence of Australia. Past literatures have positioned Australia as one of the

original countries known to become a middle power (ASEAN, 2021e). It is due to their support of International public goods, and adherence to International laws that helped them achieve such as status in the past. In the 21st century, Australia faces a strong dilemma in its conduct of regional politics in the Indo-Pacific region. Their concerns are similar to that of the US, Japan, and ASEAN, in which the Indo-Pacific region can result in such a volatile region, a place that is of high regard for Australia as it is part of its area (Sinaga, 2016). Therefore, in relation to the regional politics of Southeast Asia, Australia has been much engaged with ASEAN to better answer the challenges that have occurred in the Indo-Pacific region.

But the dilemma for Australia is pressing. China is one of the top two-way trading partners of Australia, meaning it cannot implement a harsh foreign policy despite the clashes it has had in regard to norms and interests. Furthermore, the US, despite being present in the region, it cannot be as active as the presence of China, especially in the context of economic relations. The UK, a natural ally of Australia, has also shown a slow decline in its activeness in the Indo-Pacific region due to the focus of foreign policy in the European region. Thus, one important aspect of the regional politics of Southeast Asia and Australia is the convergence of interests in order to better respond to the region's challenges (Halstead, 2008; Syafik et al., 2022).

In general, Australia, despite having different histories with Southeast Asian states, the interests converge due to similar threats and issues faced in the region (Nabbs-Keller, 2020; Troath, 2019). Australia became a dialogue partner for ASEAN in 1974, and has since then diversified the partnership to include areas of political security, economics, and socio-cultural. Australia has always

echoed the importance of ASEAN for the wider region of Southeast Asia. It supports ASEAN's role in shaping norms in the region, especially in the region most concerned for Australia, the Indo-Pacific region (ASEAN, 2021e). Australia believes that with the stability that can be maintained in Southeast Asia, the stability itself will also reach outer areas of Southeast Asia, including to Australia.

ASEAN and Australia became strategic partners in 2014. Furthermore, Australia has been active in attending the extra-regional forums of ASEAN, of which Australia is a member of. Australia also echoes the spirits of dialogue and cooperation, and the importance of an international rules-based order for the wider Indo-Pacific region. They currently work together on many non-traditional security issues that are faced by the region, including issues of terrorism, human trafficking, and natural disasters.

The last considerable middle power state in the region is India. India is categorized as one of the emerging middle powers, with greater exertion of influence globally. Together with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa, they established the BRICS, a combination of five emerging middle powers that are ready to defy the global liberal order established in the mid-20th century. In regards to where the regional political interest converges between India and ASEAN, the answer is, again, the construction of a peaceful and open Indo-Pacific region (Chacko & Willis, 2018; Maulana Prasetya & Nala Estriani, 2018). For India, which is located in the Indian Oceans, securing the stability of the Indo-Pacific region is not an option. Their trades of export and import go through those areas on a daily basis. The presence of China's BRI projects in neighboring states in Central Asia also reflects a convoluted set of dynamics, which brings a strong dilemma for India's foreign policy (Kaura, 2020). One of the safest options for

India is to strategically converge its interests with ASEAN and Southeast Asian states, despite the considerable distance between the two regions.

India is an important ally for ASEAN. They have held a bilateral summit since 2002, with initial talks occurring since 1995. It is because of this convergence that India announced the 'Act East Policy,' an initiative to promote greater economic and strategic relations with the vast Asia-Pacific region. As ASEAN and India embrace the same important areas, thus it was natural for the Indian foreign policy to focus a lot on what Southeast Asia is conducting. Despite so, the cooperation that has been evident in this context is not limited to the greater vision in the Indo-Pacific region but also relates to trade facilitation and trade investment promotion.

To conclude this section, the regional politics of Southeast Asia is a convoluted phenomenon. The presence of great powers in the form of the US and China proves to be of greater dilemma for Southeast Asian states in their conduct of regional affairs. Furthermore, the presence of rising middle powers has also proven to be a challenge in itself, specifically with India, Japan, and Australia. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis in this section show that Southeast Asian states, through ASEAN, have been able to balance the interests of all great and middle powers and find areas of cooperation that strategically converge between Southeast Asian states with its partnering state.

Chapter IV

SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In discussing the regional security dynamics of Southeast Asia, to simplify the matter, it is better to focus the discourse on traditional and non-traditional security threats. Traditional security threats relate directly to the sovereignty of state actors. It entails that state actors are the primary security stakeholder at risk, and high politics tend to be the resolution of the matter. Several cases of high politics that have been or are currently taking place in contemporary times include the South China Sea and, in the past, border issues between Cambodia and Thailand, as well as between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sipadan and Ligitan.

Meanwhile, non-traditional security threats include non-state actors in the mix. It is a form of recognition that non-state actors also pose significant security threats to the state actor, thus requiring a multilateral initiative to press the threat (Webel & Galtung, 2007). In Southeast Asia, the most apparent non-traditional security threat pertains to the problem of human security (Campbell, 2012). Referencing back to the previous chapter in this book, we can understand that Southeast Asia is filled with states that have problematic democratic systems. If we travel to Myanmar, for example, we can see the issue of democratization, which has been apparent since the 20th century. Myanmar's government has also been unable to accommodate the Rohingya people into the state, leading them to become one of the most

prosecuted internally displaced individuals in the world (King, 2021). If we travel to Indonesia, we will witness major human rights concerns over the troubled Papua region, with efforts of separatism evidently present until today (Gideon, 2021). And if we travel to Thailand, we will observe the presence of military juntas ruling the state and the continuous intervention of the military in government or public affairs (BBC, n.d.-b). Human security is a major problem in Southeast Asia and has dominated the discourse on security dynamics in the region of Southeast Asia.

This chapter will start by evaluating the issue of the South China Sea, considering the deep involvement of Southeast Asian states in the issue and how it has impacted the regional politics of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the following sub-chapter will focus on the issue of human security. Several study cases will be evaluated, but the main focus will be on the issue of human rights in Myanmar and how it has uniquely shaped the regional politics of Southeast Asia.

4.1. The South China Sea

The South China Seas borders several states in the region, including Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Taiwan, and China. It is known to be one of the most strategic areas in the world, as it hosts a vast amount of Sea Lanes of Communication and helps the process of global shipping lanes to be more efficient (HUXLEY, 1998). Most trades would go through the Strait of Malacca into areas of Southeast Asia. Located in the Pacific oceans, the South China Sea holds great geopolitical and geo-economic importance (D. Pham, n.d.). It is also known to host

vast oil and natural gas, a potential that has yet to be fully explored by actors of interest (Qi, 2019).

The current issue with the South China Seas now is that it is the center of contestation between Southeast Asian states and China. China is currently claiming that they own the overall areas of the South China Seas due to its historical claim of the Nine-Dash Line, which shows how traditional fisherman of China has explored the area on a day-to-day basis in the past, therefore, they hold rights over the seas. In the 21st century, recognition over ownership at sea, or commonly known as territorial seas, and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), are based on the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). UNCLOS is the international law that outlines the boundaries of state sovereignty at sea, with specific categories divided into territorial waters, EEZ, contingency zone, and high seas. All Southeast Asian states are members of the UNCLOS, and all adhere to the division of areas at sea by UNCLOS. The problem here is the presence of China, which proceeded to draw its own lines at sea, directly in confrontation with the aforementioned Southeast Asian States (Pemmaraju, 2016; Singh & Yamamoto, 2017). As this book focuses on the regional politics of Southeast Asia, it will only attempt to capture the dynamics of Southeast Asian states alone in response to China's assertiveness in the South China Seas.

China has implemented a policy that focuses on land reclamation. Land reclamation is essentially building islands out of nothing. The reclamation process only needs several rocks or foundations of an island, put sand on top of it, and the reclamation will be in progress. China has been operating this strategy since the early 20th century and has since then made remarkable progress in the construction of small islands in the South China Seas, including

in Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and neighboring islands in the region. Furthermore, on top of the reclaimed islands, China proceeded to build airstrips and military infrastructures to solidify its claims over those islands and areas (Yu, 2016). The repercussions of this are massive, as building an island in, for example, Paracel Islands widens the scope of China's EEZ almost 20 times that of its UNCLOS measurement. So not only does it claim most of the International waters in the South China Seas, but it proceeds to also lay claim on the EEZ of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and to a small extent, Indonesia.

China's strategy in each area is different but has been effective in pushing back state actors from their EEZ. Seeing the construction of China's artificial islands, the Philippines and Vietnam have been operating their Navy and coastguards to operate in those seas (Putra, 2021b). And it is not rare to see Chinese and foreign vessels crashing one another by accident and intended due to the confusion on the water border caused by China (Burhanuddin et al., 2021). Each time such an incident happens, China is vocal by reasserting its claim over the seas and that the vessel, navy, or foreign coastguard is violating the sovereignty of China. This may at first seem awkward and confusing, but China has successfully constructed this reality by continuing to conduct operations in the form of accompanying Chinese fishing boats to fish in the troubled waters and conducting regular navy patrols (Anugrah et al., 2020). The Philippines, in the past, has been most vocal in countering this reality. They have proceeded to take this issue to the International Arbitration Court and eventually one the case. However, the Arbitration Court does not hold as much power as the International Court of Justice, and as a result, despite winning the case, it did not

make any changes in the field. The case with Vietnam also is worthy to note in understanding the security dynamics of the South China Sea. China attempted to place a drilling rig in the EEZ of Vietnam, which China has claimed as its own territory. After massive protests and demonstrations, the rig was taken off but continues to mark yet another problematic action conducted by Chinese officials.

Indonesia is also a unique case. For years, they have faced the infiltration of Chinese, Philippines, and Vietnamese fishing boats in areas of the North Natuna Seas. Most literatures have not positioned Indonesia as a claimant state to the South China Seas, but it is important to note that China itself has conducted maneuvers around the area on a regular basis (Suryadinata, 2016; Tampi, 2018; Tiola, 2020). It was during the Jokowi presidency that this issue was taken seriously, and strict actions were made to deploy the national coastguards (BAKAMLA), navy, and other stakeholders to secure the areas.

The question that this chapter wishes to respond to is what is the response of regional politics related to the issue of the South China Sea? We need to consider in this case that half of the member states of ASEAN are claimant states to the South China Sea, and this will certainly affect the dynamics of diplomacy in the region. Before we proceed in understanding this, we will first start to evaluate the role of ASEAN in the conduct of conflict management in the South China Sea.

As stated in previous chapters, a key component of the regional politics of Southeast Asia is its ability to include extra-regional actors into the norms of ASEAN. As seen in the reality of dynamics in the South China Sea, ASEAN has only been able to adopt basic and peaceful measures to the South China Sea

dynamics. A major concluded document on the South China Sea issue is the DOC (Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Seas) (Santoso & Nafisah, 2017). This document provides an explanation of what conduct can be undergone by stakeholders that have an interest and are active in the dynamics of the South China Sea. It is inevitable to say that ASEAN has been able to achieve something that has not been achieved by any other organization or state actor in the current status quo. It has been able to make China agree upon sets of principles and measures that regulate a sensitive area known as the South China Sea.

The values and norms promoted in the DOC are considered basic but a great foundation to better the relations and the peaceful conduct in the South China Sea. It starts by reiterating the importance of promoting the South China Sea that is peaceful and harmonious in order to advance economic growth. The document also references to past ASEAN norms that correlate directly to non-interferences and the pacific settlement of disputes. Among those referenced is the TAC, which values the principle of International law adherence as of its keys. But the basic tenant of the DOC relates to what is intended to be built in the South China Seas, and this includes a sense of mutual trust, confidence, and respect (Mishra, 2017; Q. M. Pham, 2010). They also reaffirm the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Seas and how actors involved will engage in the exchange of views and combined military exercises in the region.

One thing to note about the DOC is that this is the first step before concluding the COC (Code of Conduct in the South China Seas). COC will provide the legal foundations for states to not act in an assertive matter and to not violate existing international laws. The DOC, however, should not be taken lightly. As stated

previously, China's stance and foreign policy in regards to the South China Sea has never been flexible and has also not been able to be tweaked. They stand strong in defining and defending what they believe in the context of the South China Seas and are willing to defy major global powers in its process (Parameswaran, 2015; Xinhua, 2016). An important element of the DOC that needs to be considered, though, is the fact that the DOC is a declaration, therefore, there are no consequences to violating the provisions of the DOC. Nevertheless, it should still be greeted positively, as it shows great progress on an issue that is complicated, such as the South China Seas.

The dynamics in the South China Seas have majorly affected what is happening in the regional dynamics of the South China Seas. Half of ASEAN member states are claimant states to the South China Sea, but at the same time, they are also highly dependent on Chinese investments and infrastructural development. It thus has been unique to observe the dynamics of regional politics in regard to the claimant states. Brunei Darussalam, in an article written by Putra, has claimed that due to its dependency on economic investments and FDIs from China, they have somewhat diminished its claims in the South China Sea (Putra, 2021b). The Philippines, after the arbitrary court results, have also slowly backed away from assertive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea, with the same consideration as that of Brunei.

It is without a doubt that the South China Sea dynamics have majorly affected the regional politics of the Southeast Asian region. Besides how the issue affected the regional dynamics in an individual state context, it has also affected the general regional political dynamics within ASEAN itself. For the first time in history, one of the ASEAN Summits during the Cambodia chairmanship

failed to reach an agreement during the summit. The main issue is that Cambodia did not want the use or reference of China in the South China Sea issue included in the joint statement (Hasan & Jian, 2019; Sato, 2013). Such a phenomenon is only the first of many divisions that have been constructed due to the issue of the South China Sea. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the repercussions of the South China Sea conflict are the division of opinions that have been constructed to a usually-unified ASEAN voice when it comes to security matters in the region.

4.2. Human Security Concerns in Southeast Asia

Another dynamic that has occurred and impacted the regional politics of Southeast Asia is the human security concerns in the region. It is worth noting that the issue of human security in Southeast Asia is vast. If based on the economic security of the peoples of Southeast Asia, several states in Southeast Asia are still under the line of poverty and do not have a steady stream of income. Furthermore, personal security can be seen as an issue in the Philippines, for example, especially during the 'War on Drugs' campaign of Duterte, as the Filipino people then were fearful of possible prosecutions. In conclusion, many aspects can affect human security in Southeast Asia, especially non-traditional security threats. But one pattern that can be highlighted in this case is that Southeast Asian states via ASEAN have majorly agreed by consensus to tackle issues of non-traditional security threats, including that in the human security domain. But one issue that has contributed to the dynamic of human security in Southeast Asia due to the divisions of opinions is the human security issue in Myanmar.

The issue of human security in Myanmar is one that is directly related to the dynamics of democratization in the country. With a population of approximately 50 million, Myanmar is also known for its vast human rights abuses due to the demand for democracy in the country (BBC, 2012). In 2007, due to the military junta's policy of eliminating petroleum subsidies, students, communities, and monks went to the street and demanded a change. This was eventually responded to by gross violations of human rights, as they were all subjects of the military junta's attacks. Because of the human rights concerns that have shown up in recent years, eventually, the military junta withdrew from power and allowed the process of democracy to step in. Nevertheless, despite withdrawing from its position, it is inevitable to assume that they are still very much present in the country, especially through firm political parties that have a strong say in the direction of Myanmar's future.

Besides the human security concerns related to the democratic process of Myanmar, one important phenomenon to highlight is the issue of the Rohingya people. To provide context to this, the Rohingya people are ethnic minorities of Myanmar who migrated to the country from India and Bangladesh in the 18th – 19th centuries. It was since the 1970s that oppression started to occur against these Rohingya people. Now, it is critical to first put context as to why this oppression occurred. The Rohingya people face this issue because Rohingya people are not viewed as part of the Myanmar nation (Dussich, 2018a; Junk, 2015). They are more accepted as illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh and India, which are sought to burden the Myanmar government. That is why in the current status quo, Rohingya people have not been granted citizenship rights by the Myanmar people, which means that they

have not been eligible to elect their leaders (Buzzi, 2021). The crisis that has occurred throughout time has led to mass media exposure due to the house-to-house killings and systemic violence that the Rohingya people face. Most have fled Myanmar and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and India.

In relation to the regional politics of Southeast Asia, there have been mixed responses by Southeast Asia through ASEAN collectively. Southeast Asian states are aware that the Myanmar government has perpetrated systemic violence against its own people, especially toward the Rohingya people. However, they also note that it is impossible to make any maneuvers to solve the problem, as Myanmar continuously cites ASEAN's basic principles of non-intervention, non-interference, and respect for sovereignty (Özdem, 2010a). It has thus caused major debates in the body of Southeast Asian states through ASEAN, as the focus of the International community then was on ASEAN.

ASEAN had to face strong criticism of the system and principles it adopted, considering that the violations of human rights go against any spirit of statehood in International law. Nevertheless, ASEAN has been able to balance all the interests of Southeast Asian states and external actors by implementing a safe stance to ensure that they do not violate the provisions of the ASEAN Charter, but also so that they do respond in an ASEAN manner towards the issue of human security in Myanmar (Dussich, 2018b). The complexity, though, rises during the extra-regional forums of ASEAN, in which major liberal powers such as the US, Canada, Australia, and the EU have used the platforms to voice their concerns and criticisms towards the Myanmar government pertaining the human security violations it had committed.

Chapter V

REVISITING INDONESIA'S ROLE IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS

Despite the presence of great economic opportunities for ASEAN and its allies in neighboring areas of Asia, security issues will continue to define the regional politics of Southeast Asia. As stated in the previous chapter, the security issues in Southeast Asia is essential and must be addressed in order to stay clear of potential negotiation roadblocks in other fields of cooperation. This chapter attempts to revisit Indonesia's role in regard to the two chosen security study cases of Southeast Asia. This includes the issue of Indonesia's leadership in the South China Sea as a conflict management actor and Indonesia's norm promotion of human security in the Southeast Asian region.

5.1. Indonesia's Leadership in the South China Sea Conflict Management

ASEAN currently undergoes a conflict management role in handling the issue of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, Indonesia's active role in ASEAN makes it essential for this book to highlight firstly what exactly are the roles of Indonesia in the context of the South China Seas. Indonesia, as the strongest power in Southeast Asia, is a natural and de facto leader of the regional organization (Emmers, 2014). The early principles of ASEAN were

all pushed by Indonesia, as Indonesia became the driving force of the establishment of ZOPFAN, for example, in 1971, which established a nuclear-free zone for Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it was a major proponent of the TAC that was concluded in 1976. The values of sovereignty appreciation and non-interference strategically converge with Indonesia's foreign policy; thus, Indonesia has implemented a foreign policy in which it was proactive in the construction of peaceful norms in Southeast Asia (Benny et al., 2014; Darwis & Putra, 2022).

But it was during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency that Indonesia showed its true capacity as a regional leader in Southeast Asia. Several of the foreign policies implemented include 'Geographic Proximity' and 'Dynamic Equilibrium.' Both foreign policies consider the importance of regional neighbors of Southeast Asia and the importance of establishing ASEAN centrality to cater to the interests of all states near.

Before its conflict management role in the context of Southeast Asia, Indonesia's unique position in ASEAN has led it to embrace a conflict management role in the past. Since 1958, Thailand and Cambodia have undergone tensions on the border, with the issue of the border taking place in the areas near Preah Vihear Temple. Both actors have deployed their respective military to safeguard the borders due to the rising tensions in the early 20th century. Observing the rising tensions, especially in 2010 and 2011, Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's then foreign affairs minister, decided to take the initiative to manage the tensions that occurred between the two-member states of ASEAN (Putra, 2015b). Natalegawa decided to negotiate with both leaders during the ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministerial Meeting 2011 that took place in Jakarta, as Natalegawa viewed that any form of tensions between ASEAN should

immediately be addressed without hesitation. The two sides initially decided to allow the deployment of Indonesian military and civilian observers to monitor the process of the ceasefire agreement.

Indonesia's exertion of influence is the key element of Indonesia's conflict management role. In the concept of conflict management, the main-sought outcome is to manage the tensions that rose among conflicting actors. Therefore, the primary aim here is to ensure that an all-out war does not occur, not the actual resolution of the issue (Chang et al., 2010; Webel & Galtung, 2007). It is a short-term goal, but one that is essential for the resolution course of the conflict. Indonesia's attempt to manage the tensions between Cambodia and Thailand would continue in several study cases, and one in the South China Seas.

As stated in the previous chapter, Indonesia is not a formal claimant state of the South China Seas but has a strong interest in its resolution. The first reason is because of the importance of the region to its neighbors in Southeast Asia. In order to ease the bilateral tensions, Indonesia had to step in to attempt to manage the tensions that had risen (Tan, 2015). The second reason is Indonesia does have a small claim in the South China Seas, known as the North Natuna Seas. This area has been used by many illegal fishermen to fish in Indonesia's EEZ. This is a growing concern for Indonesia, in which it wishes to resolve along with the bigger issue of the South China Seas dispute.

As a de facto leader of ASEAN, Indonesia has pushed the urgency of the DOC to be implemented. Throughout the process of negotiating this document within ASEAN and with China, Indonesia has been active in the process of ensuring all interests are accommodated in the DOC. Despite so, it has been difficult for

Indonesia to directly dive into the issue of the South China Seas, considering that its claim compared to other Southeast Asian states is small (Darwis et al., 2020). Any peaceful attempts forwarded by Indonesia have been overshadowed by the presence of high politics and unpeaceful gestures shown by the main claimant states to the South China Seas, especially Vietnam and the Philippines.

Despite so, Indonesia showed great leadership during the 2012 ASEAN ministerial meeting. As tensions rose between ASEAN member states, due to the refusal to issue a joint communique related to Cambodia and China, Indonesia stepped in to negotiate better and more acceptable terms, which thus led to the approval of the joint communique in ASEAN. The South China Sea issue, as stated in the previous chapter, has caused divisions within ASEAN, and Indonesia has done well to somewhat manage the tensions and issues that have arisen.

5.2. Indonesia's Norm Promotion in Human Security Issues of Southeast Asia

The issue in Myanmar is one that is difficult for Indonesia to be proactive in. The basic principles adopted by ASEAN, including the norms of non-interference, have become the major issue of Indonesia's intentions to help resolve the issue. As a consequence, in the mid of various human security crises that occurred in Myanmar, Indonesia had to implement a passive role in even responding to the crisis. Each rhetoric used by Indonesia is also carefully carved so that it does not violate the agreed principles of ASEAN and the importance of the non-interference principle.

It has, though, been difficult for Indonesia to keep a silent role. Indonesia is the largest Muslim population in the world, which

has led them to be active in any issues related to the Muslim world. It has, for example, become very active in pushing for a peaceful resolution to the Palestine and Israel issues and has been criticized for not being active enough in the case of the Rohingya people. It is without a doubt that the Rohingya crisis is both a humanitarian crisis and a crisis for the Muslim world.

In conclusion, Indonesia implemented a different approach to what it implemented in the South China Seas issue. It abandoned its conflict management role and focused on the initiative to open humanitarian space for the Rohingya people (Asrar, 2017; Islam, 2020; Milton et al., 2017). It also made sure through its rhetoric that Indonesia is primarily focused on the Rohingya people, not on the ill democratization process of Myanmar, which is a problem that can easily be mixed up. As seen in the past, there was a tragic event known as Cyclone Nargis in 2008. Hundreds and thousands of people became victims of the cyclone, which eventually caused a major humanitarian crisis. As a result, the International community offered packages of humanitarian aid to Myanmar, but the military junta declined. The reason for this is that it feared if foreign actors started intruding on Myanmar because it intended to send humanitarian aid, people of the world would soon notice of the vast humanitarian crisis that occurred besides that caused by the cyclone (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2008; Özerdem, 2010a, 2010b). The junta decided to close its borders, leading addition of hundreds and thousands of other innocent citizens losing their lives. This should speak volumes of how the military junta and Myanmar government work on a day-to-day basis. It focuses on closing any potential attempts of foreign intervention and interferences as to how they run their country.

One of the major humanitarian crises that occurred relating to the Rohingya people in Myanmar was the crisis of 2017. With hundreds and thousands of prosecuted Rohingyas in Myanmar and thousands more fleeing the country, it caused a massive humanitarian crisis for the wider region of Southeast Asia. Myanmar though did not want any external actor to intervene in the crisis. It wanted to deal with it solely alone, without the help of anyone. This is understandable, as most of the fact has pointed out that it is the Myanmar government that perpetuated the crisis, not a naturally occurring phenomenon (Nishikawa, 2018). Following the crisis, international organizations such as the UN and regional organizations such as ASEAN attempted to pressure the Myanmar government to stop and provide assistance to the Rohingya people. The result of this is quite simple, in which Myanmar exercised its rights of non-interference and declined all suggestions made by foreign actors.

Indonesia took a different stream as it attempted to implement a bilateral-based solution in alleviating the humanitarian crisis that had just occurred in Myanmar. Indonesia assured that any forms of proposals are only designated to the Rohingya people, not to the interference aspect to Myanmar. They made sure not to use harsh rhetoric and continued to reiterate the principles upheld by ASEAN, including non-interference and respect for sovereignty. As a result, they were able to negotiate the opening of humanitarian space for the Rohingya people with assistance and also through the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and ASEAN. Furthermore, Indonesia showed great support to the established organization specifically aimed to assist the Rohingya people in Myanmar, commonly known as AKIM (Indonesian humanitarian alliance for Myanmar).

AKIM is an initiative of the Indonesian government, coordinated directly by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of a solid team of Indonesian individuals concerned with the occurring crisis in Myanmar, as well as NGOs that wish to contribute to alleviating the humanitarian crisis (Dussich, 2018a; Haque & Chambers, 2020). Through this program, Indonesia showed great leadership in properly handling an issue that is sensitive to the host country but also helping those that truly needed the assistance. They focused on increasing livelihood and, most importantly, the process of recovery.

It is worthy to note that Indonesia did not only act out of the spirit of humanitarian causes. Indonesia embraces a strong interest in securing future investments and good economic relations with all ASEAN members, including Myanmar. It is not to say, though, that Indonesia is willing to put a blind eye to humanitarian crisis, as it will tarnish its image as a de facto leader if it allows such violations of global norms to take place. Nevertheless, Indonesia has maintained a solid bilateral relation with Myanmar, and does not plan to tarnish it due to instances of human security. It is though also a great interest of Indonesia to act fast and decisive in responding to the crisis. Most of the Rohingya refugees have made their way to Indonesia to seek refuge. With the increasing number of asylum seekers in the past several years, it is also a pivotal interest of Indonesia to help resolve or alleviate the occurring crisis directly from its source.

Concluding Remarks

Southeast Asia is known to be one of the most strategic geopolitical and geo-economic regions in the world. The vast natural resources and the growing nations in Southeast Asia have attracted the attention of major global and regional powers to interact with Southeast Asian states. Nevertheless, the presence of numerous security challenges in Southeast Asia has made it a challenge for regional organizations such as ASEAN and individual Southeast Asian states to cope with the growing dynamics. Tensions have not faded in the South China Seas, and the human security concerns have only risen in Myanmar. The contemporary regional politics of Southeast Asia will continue to be challenged to face those issues in the near and distant future.

This book attempts to capture the occurring regional dynamics of Southeast Asia, including how Indonesia, as a de facto leader of the region, has coped in responding to the emerging crises. This book starts by discussing the region of Southeast Asia in general. In comparison to other regional areas of the world, the Southeast Asian identity is constructed, as there were no aspects that could unify Southeast Asia besides the constructed convergence of national interests that surfaced firstly during the Cold War. Several dynamics that were found in the historical aspects of the Southeast Asian region eventually could be found in the future. ASEAN and Southeast Asia have not changed much in their operation. It focuses on establishing a form of regionalism with the implementation of unique sets of norms and principles through ASEAN. This strategy, as argued in this book, relates directly to Finnemore and Sikkink's 'Norm Life Cycle' theory, with the implementation of norms including non-interference and respect over sovereignty, to member states of ASEAN.

Following the first chapter is the argumentation on the strategies of Southeast Asian states in facing regional hegemons and global hegemons. This also correlates directly to middle power foreign policies through a selection of several key study cases. This book attempts to capture the dynamics of extra-regional politics in Southeast Asia, with the inclusion of the East Asian connection, and how Southeast Asia has been able to embrace great powers in the Southeast Asian region. East Asia, as a direct neighbouring region of Southeast Asia, has had close ties with Southeast Asia. This has and will continue to become a major feature of the regional politics of Southeast Asia, as the economic intensification of relations and the convergence of regional political interests are what ties the relations between Southeast Asia to countries such as Japan, China, and South Korea. Furthermore, ASEAN has also attempted to embrace the presence of great powers, including the US, Russia, and China, in the extra-regional forums established under ASEAN, including the APT, ARF, and EAS.

But one of the surprising contemporary regional dynamics in Southeast Asia is the emerging presence of middle powers, including Australia, Japan, and India. They all have different interests in the region but have a common interest in establishing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The establishment of ASEAN's extra-regional forums attempts to capture those interests and prove that ASEAN centrality is still much relevant to the contemporary dynamics of regional politics in the region. The implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific not only captured the interests of emerging middle powers but also of traditional hegemons such as China and the US. It is critical to note of the great power rivalries between the two states, and how it has evolved from time to time. At the centre of the contestation is Southeast

Asia, and through this book, they have succeeded in responding to the challenge by the inclusion of those powers in a series of extra-regional forums constructed by ASEAN.

Security in Southeast Asia continues to become a major challenge for Southeast Asian states. As can be seen, the issue of the South China Sea and non-traditional security threats, including those that occurred in Rohingya, and Myanmar, have consistently divided the opinions and positions of Southeast Asian states. Both issues have effectively affected the conduct of foreign relations in Southeast Asia, despite the numerous efforts to find a resolution. Indonesia, however, continues to show its leadership role in the region. We revisit this through discourses of conflict management and leadership in the regional organization, as Indonesia is able to effectively manage the tensions in the South China Sea by pushing the agendas of confidence-measure building. Furthermore, in the case of the Rohingya people, Indonesia also continues to display its leadership through effective conduct of soft diplomacy to help cater to the needs of both the Myanmar government and the Rohingya people.

Southeast Asia will continue to become a dynamic region. The growing discourse on the uncertainties of the Indo-Pacific region should be seen as a major concern for policymakers in the Southeast Asian region. Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite the growing assertiveness and aggression found in the regional politics of Southeast Asia, they have been able to adapt to emerging challenges through implementing traditional yet modified policies.

Appendixes

Appendix 1: ASEAN Charter

PREAMBLE

WE, THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as represented by the Heads of State or Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam:

NOTING with satisfaction the significant achievements and expansion of ASEAN since its establishment in Bangkok through the promulgation of The ASEAN Declaration;

RECALLING the decisions to establish an ASEAN Charter in the Vientiane Action Programme, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter and the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter;

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and interdependence among the peoples and Member States of ASEAN which are bound by geography, common objectives and shared destiny;

INSPIRED by and united under One Vision, One Identity and One Caring and Sharing Community;

UNITED by a common desire and collective will to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability, sustained economic growth,

shared prosperity and social progress, and to promote our vital interests, ideals and aspirations;

RESPECTING the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity;

ADHERING to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

RESOLVED to ensure sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations and to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process;

CONVINCED of the need to strengthen existing bonds of regional solidarity to realise an ASEAN Community that is politically cohesive, economically integrated and socially responsible in order to effectively respond to current and future challenges and opportunities;

COMMITTED to intensifying community building through enhanced regional cooperation and integration, in particular by establishing an ASEAN Community comprising the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, as provided for in the Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord II;

HEREBY DECIDE to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN,

AND TO THIS END, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of ASEAN, assembled in Singapore on the historic occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN, have agreed to this Charter.

CHAPTER I

PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1

PURPOSES

The Purposes of ASEAN are:

1. To maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region;
2. To enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political, security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation;
3. To preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction;
4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;
5. To create a single market and production base which is stable, prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which there is free flow of goods, services and investment; facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labour; and freer flow of capital;

6. To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation;
7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN;
8. To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and transboundary challenges;
9. To promote sustainable development so as to ensure the protection of the region's environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, the preservation of its cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its peoples;
10. To develop human resources through closer cooperation in education and life-long learning, and in science and technology, for the empowerment of the peoples of ASEAN and for the strengthening of the ASEAN Community;
11. To enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare and justice;
12. To strengthen cooperation in building a safe, secure and drug-free environment for the peoples of ASEAN;
13. To promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN integration and community building;
14. To promote an ASEAN identity through the fostering of greater awareness of the diverse culture and heritage of the region; and

15. To maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive.

ARTICLE 2

PRINCIPLES

1. In pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, ASEAN and its Member States reaffirm and adhere to the fundamental principles contained in the declarations, agreements, conventions, concords, treaties and other instruments of ASEAN.
2. ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following Principles:
 - a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;
 - b) shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity;
 - c) renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law;
 - d) reliance on peaceful settlement of disputes;
 - e) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States;
 - f) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion;

- g) enhanced consultations on matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN;
- h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government;
- i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice;
- j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States;
- k) abstention from participation in any policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States;
- l) respect for the different cultures, languages and religions of the peoples of ASEAN, while emphasising their common values in the spirit of unity in diversity;
- m) the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory; and
- n) adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN's rules-based regimes for effective implementation of economic commitments and progressive reduction towards elimination of all barriers to regional economic integration, in a market-driven economy.

CHAPTER II

LEGAL PERSONALITY

ARTICLE 3

LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ASEAN

ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality.

CHAPTER III

MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE 4

MEMBER STATES

The Member States of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

ARTICLE 5

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1. Member States shall have equal rights and obligations under this Charter.
2. Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.
3. In the case of a serious breach of the Charter or noncompliance, the matter shall be referred to Article 20.

ARTICLE 6

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

1. The procedure for application and admission to ASEAN shall be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.
2. Admission shall be based on the following criteria:
 - a) location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia;
 - b) recognition by all ASEAN Member States;
 - c) agreement to be bound and to abide by the Charter; and
 - d) ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of Membership.
3. Admission shall be decided by consensus by the ASEAN Summit, upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Coordinating Council.

4. An applicant State shall be admitted to ASEAN upon signing an Instrument of Accession to the Charter.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANS

ARTICLE 7

ASEAN SUMMIT

1. The ASEAN Summit shall comprise the Heads of State or Government of the Member States.
2. The ASEAN Summit shall:
 - a) be the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN;
 - b) deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on key issues pertaining to the realisation of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interest to Member States and all issues referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies;
 - c) instruct the relevant Ministers in each of the Councils concerned to hold ad hoc inter-Ministerial meetings, and address important issues concerning ASEAN that cut across the Community Councils. Rules of procedure for such meetings shall be adopted by the ASEAN Coordinating Council;
 - d) address emergency situations affecting ASEAN by taking appropriate actions;
 - e) decide on matters referred to it under Chapters VII and VIII;

- f) authorise the establishment and the dissolution of Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other ASEAN institutions; and
 - g) appoint the Secretary-General of ASEAN, with the rank and status of Minister, who will serve with the confidence and at the pleasure of the Heads of State or Government upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
3. ASEAN Summit Meetings shall be:
- a) held twice annually, and be hosted by the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship; and
 - b) convened, whenever necessary, as special or ad hoc meetings to be chaired by the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship, at venues to be agreed upon by ASEAN Member States.

ARTICLE 8

ASEAN COORDINATING COUNCIL

1. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall comprise the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and meet at least twice a year.
2. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall:
 - a) prepare the meetings of the ASEAN Summit;
 - b) coordinate the implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit;
 - c) coordinate with the ASEAN Community Councils to enhance policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation among them;
 - d) coordinate the reports of the ASEAN Community Councils to the ASEAN Summit;
 - e) consider the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of ASEAN;

- f) consider the report of the Secretary-General on the functions and operations of the ASEAN Secretariat and other relevant bodies;
 - g) approve the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries-General upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General; and undertake other tasks provided for in this Charter or such other functions as may be assigned by the ASEAN Summit.
3. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall be supported by the relevant senior officials.

ARTICLE 9

ASEAN COMMUNITY COUNCILS

1. The ASEAN Community Councils shall comprise the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council.
2. Each ASEAN Community Council shall have under its purview the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies.
3. Each Member State shall designate its national representation for each ASEAN Community Council meeting.
4. In order to realise the objectives of each of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, each ASEAN Community Council shall:
 - a) ensure the implementation of the relevant decisions of the ASEAN Summit;

- b) coordinate the work of the different sectors under its purview, and on issues which cut across the other Community Councils; and
 - c) submit reports and recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters under its purview.
5. Each ASEAN Community Council shall meet at least twice a year and shall be chaired by the appropriate Minister from the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship.
 6. Each ASEAN Community Council shall be supported by the relevant senior officials.

ARTICLE 10

ASEAN SECTORAL MINISTERIAL BODIES

1. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies shall:
 - a) function in accordance with their respective established mandates;
 - b) implement the agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit under their respective purview;
 - c) strengthen cooperation in their respective fields in support of ASEAN integration and community building; and
 - d) submit reports and recommendations to their respective Community Councils.
2. Each ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Body may have under its purview the relevant senior officials and subsidiary bodies to undertake its functions.

ARTICLE 11

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ASEAN AND ASEAN SECRETARIAT

1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN shall be appointed by the ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of office of five years, selected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation, with due consideration to integrity, capability and professional experience, and gender equality.
2. The Secretary-General shall:
 - a) carry out the duties and responsibilities of this high office in accordance with the provisions of this Charter and relevant ASEAN instruments, protocols and established practices;
 - b) facilitate and monitor progress in the implementation of ASEAN agreements and decisions, and submit an annual report on the work of ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit;
 - c) participate in meetings of the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Community Councils, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and other relevant ASEAN meetings;
 - d) present the views of ASEAN and participate in meetings with external parties in accordance with approved policy guidelines and mandate given to the Secretary-General; and
 - e) recommend the appointment and termination of the Deputy Secretaries-General to the ASEAN Coordinating Council for approval.
3. The Secretary-General shall also be the Chief Administrative Officer of ASEAN.

4. The Secretary-General shall be assisted by four Deputy Secretaries-General with the rank and status of Deputy Ministers. The Deputy Secretaries-General shall be accountable to the Secretary-General in carrying out their functions.
5. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall be of different nationalities from the Secretary-General and shall come from four different ASEAN Member States.
6. The four Deputy Secretaries-General shall comprise:
 - a) two Deputy Secretaries-General who will serve a non-renewable term of three years, selected from among nationals of the ASEAN Member States based on alphabetical rotation, with due consideration to integrity, qualifications, competence, experience and gender equality; and
 - b) two Deputy Secretaries-General who will serve a term of three years, which may be renewed for another three years. These two Deputy Secretaries-General shall be openly recruited based on merit.
7. The ASEAN Secretariat shall comprise the Secretary-General and such staff as may be required.
8. The Secretary-General and the staff shall:
 - a) uphold the highest standards of integrity, efficiency, and competence in the performance of their duties;
 - b) not seek or receive instructions from any government or external party outside of ASEAN; and
 - c) refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as ASEAN Secretariat officials responsible only to ASEAN.
9. Each ASEAN Member State undertakes to respect the exclusively ASEAN character of the responsibilities of the

Secretary-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

ARTICLE 12

COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO ASEAN

1. Each ASEAN Member State shall appoint a Permanent Representative to ASEAN with the rank of Ambassador based in Jakarta.
2. The Permanent Representatives collectively constitute a Committee of Permanent Representatives, which shall:
 - a) support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies;
 - b) coordinate with ASEAN National Secretariats and other ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies;
 - c) liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work;
 - d) facilitate ASEAN cooperation with external partners; and
 - e) perform such other functions as may be determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.

ARTICLE 13

ASEAN NATIONAL SECRETARIATS

Each ASEAN Member State shall establish an ASEAN National Secretariat which shall:

- a) serve as the national focal point;

- b) be the repository of information on all ASEAN matters at the national level;
- c) coordinate the implementation of ASEAN decisions at the national level;
- d) coordinate and support the national preparations of ASEAN meetings;
- e) promote ASEAN identity and awareness at the national level;
and
- f) contribute to ASEAN community building.

ARTICLE 14

ASEAN HUMAN RIGHTS BODY

1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.

ARTICLE 15

ASEAN FOUNDATION

1. The ASEAN Foundation shall support the Secretary General of ASEAN and collaborate with the relevant ASEAN bodies to support ASEAN community building by promoting greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-to-people

interaction, and close collaboration among the business sector, civil society, academia and other stakeholders in ASEAN.

2. The ASEAN Foundation shall be accountable to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall submit its report to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council.

CHAPTER V

ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ASEAN

ARTICLE 16

ENTITIES ASSOCIATED WITH ASEAN

1. ASEAN may engage with entities which support the ASEAN Charter, in particular its purposes and principles.
2. Rules of procedure and criteria for engagement shall be prescribed by the Committee of Permanent Representatives upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

CHAPTER VI

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES ARTICLE 17 IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF ASEAN

1. ASEAN shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. The immunities and privileges shall be laid down in separate agreements between ASEAN and the host Member State.

ARTICLE 18

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE SECRETARYGENERAL OF ASEAN AND STAFF OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT

1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN and staff of the ASEAN Secretariat participating in official ASEAN activities or representing ASEAN in the Member States shall enjoy such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions.
2. The immunities and privileges under this Article shall be laid down in a separate ASEAN agreement.

ARTICLE 19

IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND OFFICIALS ON ASEAN DUTIES

1. The Permanent Representatives of the Member States to ASEAN and officials of the Member States participating in official ASEAN activities or representing ASEAN in the Member States shall enjoy such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the exercise of their functions.
2. The immunities and privileges of the Permanent Representatives and officials on ASEAN duties shall be governed by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or in accordance with the national law of the ASEAN Member State concerned.

CHAPTER VIII

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 22

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. Member States shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation.
2. ASEAN shall maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN cooperation.

ARTICLE 23

GOOD OFFICES, CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION

1. Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation in order to resolve the dispute within an agreed time limit.
2. Parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN, acting in an exofficio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.

ARTICLE 24

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS IN SPECIFIC INSTRUMENTS

1. Disputes relating to specific ASEAN instruments shall be settled through the mechanisms and procedures provided for in such instruments.
2. Disputes which do not concern the interpretation or application of any ASEAN instrument shall be resolved peacefully in accordance with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and its rules of procedure.
3. Where not otherwise specifically provided, disputes which concern the interpretation or application of ASEAN economic agreements shall be settled in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

ARTICLE 25

ESTABLISHMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS

Where not otherwise specifically provided, appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, shall be established for disputes which concern the interpretation or application of this Charter and other ASEAN instruments.

ARTICLE 26

UNRESOLVED DISPUTES

When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision.

ARTICLE 27

COMPLIANCE

1. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designated ASEAN body, shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit.
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision.

ARTICLE 28

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS AND OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES

Unless otherwise provided for in this Charter, Member States have the right of recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations or any other international legal instruments to which the disputing Member States are parties.

CHAPTER IX

BUDGET AND FINANCE

ARTICLE 29

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. ASEAN shall establish financial rules and procedures in accordance with international standards.
2. ASEAN shall observe sound financial management policies and practices and budgetary discipline.
3. Financial accounts shall be subject to internal and external audits.

ARTICLE 30

OPERATIONAL BUDGET AND FINANCES OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT

1. The ASEAN Secretariat shall be provided with the necessary financial resources to perform its functions effectively.
2. The operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat shall be met by ASEAN Member States through equal annual contributions which shall be remitted in a timely manner.
3. The Secretary-General shall prepare the annual operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat for approval by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives.

4. The ASEAN Secretariat shall operate in accordance with the financial rules and procedures determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives.

CHAPTER X

ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE

ARTICLE 31

CHAIRMAN OF ASEAN

1. The Chairmanship of ASEAN shall rotate annually, based on the alphabetical order of the English names of Member States.
2. ASEAN shall have, in a calendar year, a single Chairmanship by which the Member State assuming the Chairmanship shall chair:
 - a) the ASEAN Summit and related summits;
 - b) the ASEAN Coordinating Council;
 - c) the three ASEAN Community Councils;
 - d) where appropriate, the relevant ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and senior officials; and
 - e) the Committee of Permanent Representatives.

ARTICLE 32

ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF ASEAN

The Member State holding the Chairmanship of ASEAN shall:

- a) actively promote and enhance the interests and wellbeing of ASEAN, including efforts to build an ASEAN Community through policy initiatives, coordination, consensus and cooperation;
- b) ensure the centrality of ASEAN;
- c) ensure an effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN, including providing its good offices and such other arrangements to immediately address these concerns;
- d) represent ASEAN in strengthening and promoting closer relations with external partners; and
- e) carry out such other tasks and functions as may be mandated.

ARTICLE 33

DIPLOMATIC PROTOCOL AND PRACTICES

ASEAN and its Member States shall adhere to existing diplomatic protocol and practices in the conduct of all activities relating to ASEAN. Any changes shall be approved by the ASEAN Coordinating Council upon the recommendation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives.

ARTICLE 34

WORKING LANGUAGE OF ASEAN

The working language of ASEAN shall be English.

CHAPTER XI

IDENTITY AND SYMBOLS

ARTICLE 35

ASEAN IDENTITY

ASEAN shall promote its common ASEAN identity and a sense of belonging among its peoples in order to achieve its shared destiny, goals and values.

ARTICLE 36

ASEAN MOTTO

The ASEAN motto shall be: "One Vision, One Identity, One Community"

ARTICLE 37

ASEAN FLAG.

ARTICLE 38

ASEAN EMBLEM

The ASEAN emblem.

ARTICLE 39

ASEAN DAY The eighth of August shall be observed as ASEAN Day.

ARTICLE 40

ASEAN ANTHEM

ASEAN shall have an anthem.

CHAPTER XII

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

ARTICLE 41

CONDUCT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS

1. ASEAN shall develop friendly relations and mutually beneficial dialogue, cooperation and partnerships with countries and sub-regional, regional and international organisations and institutions.
2. The external relations of ASEAN shall adhere to the purposes and principles set forth in this Charter.
3. ASEAN shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintain its centrality in regional cooperation and community building.
4. In the conduct of external relations of ASEAN, Member States shall, on the basis of unity and solidarity, coordinate and

endeavour to develop common positions and pursue joint actions.

5. The strategic policy directions of ASEAN's external relations shall be set by the ASEAN Summit upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
6. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting shall ensure consistency and coherence in the conduct of ASEAN's external relations.
7. ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries or subregional, regional and international organisations and institutions. The procedures for concluding such agreements shall be prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council in consultation with the ASEAN Community Councils.

ARTICLE 42

DIALOGUE COORDINATOR

1. Member States, acting as Country Coordinators, shall take turns to take overall responsibility in coordinating and promoting the interests of ASEAN in its relations with the relevant Dialogue Partners, regional and international organisations and institutions.
2. In relations with the external partners, the Country Coordinators shall, inter alia:
 - a) represent ASEAN and enhance relations on the basis of mutual respect and equality, in conformity with ASEAN's principles;
 - b) co-chair relevant meetings between ASEAN and external partners; and

- c) be supported by the relevant ASEAN Committees in Third Countries and International Organisations.

ARTICLE 43

ASEAN COMMITTEES IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1. ASEAN Committees in Third Countries may be established in non-ASEAN countries comprising heads of diplomatic missions of ASEAN Member States. Similar Committees may be established relating to international organisations. Such Committees shall promote ASEAN's interests and identity in the host countries and international organisations.
2. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting shall determine the rules of procedure of such Committees.

ARTICLE 44

STATUS OF EXTERNAL PARTIES

1. In conducting ASEAN's external relations, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting may confer on an external party the formal status of Dialogue Partner, Sectoral Dialogue Partner, Development Partner, Special Observer, Guest, or other status that may be established henceforth.
2. External parties may be invited to ASEAN meetings or cooperative activities without being conferred any formal status, in accordance with the rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 45

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

1. ASEAN may seek an appropriate status with the United Nations system as well as with other sub-regional, regional, international organisations and institutions.
2. The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall decide on the participation of ASEAN in other sub-regional, regional, international organisations and institutions.

ARTICLE 46

ACCREDITATION OF NON-ASEAN MEMBER STATES TO ASEAN

Non-ASEAN Member States and relevant inter-governmental organisations may appoint and accredit Ambassadors to ASEAN. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting shall decide on such accreditation.

CHAPTER XIII

GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 47

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, DEPOSITORY AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Charter shall be signed by all ASEAN Member States.
2. This Charter shall be subject to ratification by all ASEAN Member States in accordance with their respective internal procedures.
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN who shall promptly notify all Member States of each deposit.
4. This Charter shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

ARTICLE 48

AMENDMENTS

1. Any Member State may propose amendments to the Charter.
2. Proposed amendments to the Charter shall be submitted by the ASEAN Coordinating Council by consensus to the ASEAN Summit for its decision.
3. Amendments to the Charter agreed to by consensus by the ASEAN Summit shall be ratified by all Member States in accordance with Article 47.
4. An amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

ARTICLE 49

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE

Unless otherwise provided for in this Charter, the ASEAN Coordinating Council shall determine the terms of reference and rules of procedure and shall ensure their consistency.

ARTICLE 50

REVIEW

This Charter may be reviewed five years after its entry into force or as otherwise determined by the ASEAN Summit.

ARTICLE 51

INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER

1. Upon the request of any Member State, the interpretation of the Charter shall be undertaken by the ASEAN Secretariat in accordance with the rules of procedure determined by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.
2. Any dispute arising from the interpretation of the Charter shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions in Chapter VIII.
3. Headings and titles used throughout the Charter shall only be for the purpose of reference.

ARTICLE 52

LEGAL CONTINUITY

1. All treaties, conventions, agreements, concords, declarations, protocols and other ASEAN instruments which have been in effect before the entry into force of this Charter shall continue to be valid.
2. In case of inconsistency between the rights and obligations of ASEAN Member States under such instruments and this Charter, the Charter shall prevail.

ARTICLE 53

ORIGINAL TEXT

The signed original text of this Charter in English shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of ASEAN, who shall provide a certified copy to each Member State.

ARTICLE 54

REGISTRATION OF THE ASEAN CHARTER

This Charter shall be registered by the Secretary-General of ASEAN with the Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 55

ASEAN ASSETS

The assets and funds of the Organisation shall be vested in the name of ASEAN.

Done in Singapore on the Twentieth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Seven, in a single original in the English language.

Appendix 2: Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

The High Contracting Parties:

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;

DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations¹, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation;

BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows:

CHAPTER I: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1 The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

ARTICLE 2 In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles: a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

CHAPTER II : AMITY

ARTICLE 3 In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

CHAPTER III : COOPERATION

ARTICLE 4 The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspirations of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest.

ARTICLE 5 Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, nondiscrimination and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 6 The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard,

they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international and regional organisations outside the region.

ARTICLE 7 The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

ARTICLE 8 The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

ARTICLE 9 The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views actions and policies.

ARTICLE 10 Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 11 The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political,

economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.

ARTICLE 12 The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER IV: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 13 The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them should arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

ARTICLE 14 To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.

ARTICLE 15 In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.

ARTICLE 16 The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.

ARTICLE 17 Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V: General Provision

ARTICLE 18 This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic

of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory State. It shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.

ARTICLE 19 This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and the instruments of ratification or accession.

ARTICLE 20 This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation. IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals. DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

Appendix 3: Declaration of the Conduct of Parties the South China Sea

The Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

REAFFIRMING their determination to consolidate and develop the friendship and cooperation existing between their people and governments with the view to promoting a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;

COGNIZANT of the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity in the region;

COMMITTED to enhancing the principles and objectives of the 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and President of the People's Republic of China;

DESIRING to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;

HEREBY DECLARE the following:

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms governing state-to-state relations;

2. The Parties are committed to exploring ways for building trust and confidence in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and on the basis of equality and mutual respect;
3. The Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.
Pending the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of cooperation and understanding, to build trust and confidence between and among them, including:
 - a. holding dialogues and exchange of views as appropriate between their defense and military officials;
 - b. ensuring just and humane treatment of all persons who are either in danger or in distress;

- c. notifying, on a voluntary basis, other Parties concerned of any impending joint/combined military exercise; and
 - d. exchanging, on a voluntary basis, relevant information.
6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the following:
- a. marine environmental protection;
 - b. marine scientific research;
 - c. safety of navigation and communication at sea;
 - d. search and rescue operation; and
 - e. combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.

The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior to their actual implementation.

7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them;
8. The Parties undertake to respect the provisions of this Declaration and take actions consistent therewith;
9. The Parties encourage other countries to respect the principles contained in this Declaration;
10. The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace

and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.

Done on the Fourth Day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Two in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia.

Appendix 4: Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam;

RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region;

NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia;

CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association's

guidelines in achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995);

COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN cooperation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA);

CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation;

REITERATING that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is an effective code of conduct for relations among governments and peoples;

RECOGNIZING that sustainable economic development requires a secure political environment based on a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation and political solidarity;

COGNIZANT of the interdependence of the ASEAN economies and the need for ASEAN member countries to adopt "Prosper Thy Neighbour" policies in order to ensure the long-term vibrancy and prosperity of the ASEAN region;

REITERATING the importance of rules-based multilateral trading system that is equitable and that contributes towards the pursuit of development;

REAFFIRMING that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony;

DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT:

1. An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region;
2. ASEAN shall continue its efforts to ensure closer and mutually beneficial integration among its member states and

among their peoples, and to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and prosperity with a view to realizing an ASEAN Community that is open, dynamic and resilient;

3. ASEAN shall respond to the new dynamics within the respective ASEAN Member Countries and shall urgently and effectively address the challenge of translating ASEAN cultural diversities and different economic levels into equitable development opportunity and prosperity, in an environment of solidarity, regional resilience and harmony;
4. ASEAN shall nurture common values, such as habit of consultation to discuss political issues and the willingness to share information on matters of common concern, such as environmental degradation, maritime security cooperation, the enhancement of defense cooperation among ASEAN countries, develop a set of socio-political values and principles, and resolve to settle long-standing disputes through peaceful means;
5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) is the key code of conduct governing relations between states and a diplomatic instrument for the promotion of peace and stability in the region;
6. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) shall remain the primary forum in enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, as well as the pivot in building peace and stability in the region. ASEAN shall enhance its role in further

advancing the stages of cooperation within the ARF to ensure the security of the Asia Pacific region;

7. ASEAN is committed to deepening and broadening its internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy to realize an ASEAN Economic Community through a bold, pragmatic and unified strategy;
8. ASEAN shall further build on the momentum already gained in the ASEAN+3 process so as to further draw synergies through broader and deeper cooperation in various areas;
9. ASEAN shall build upon opportunities for mutually beneficial regional integration arising from its existing initiatives and those with partners, through enhanced trade and investment links as well as through IAI process and the RIA;
10. ASEAN shall continue to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common regional identity;

DO HEREBY ADOPT:

The framework to achieve a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community:

- A. ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY (ASC)
 1. The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane

to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The ASEAN Security Community members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.

2. The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defense arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities, subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security as having broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than to a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.
3. ASEAN shall continue to promote regional solidarity and cooperation. Member Countries shall exercise their rights to lead their national existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs.
4. The ASEAN Security Community shall abide by the UN Charter and other principles of international law and uphold ASEAN's principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes.

5. Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be addressed regionally in holistic, integrated and comprehensive manner. Maritime cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the evolution of the ASEAN Security Community.
6. Existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on ZOPFAN, the TAC, and the SEANWFZ Treaty shall continue to play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and the approaches to conflict resolution.
7. The High Council of the TAC shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN's commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully.
8. The ASEAN Security Community shall contribute to further promoting peace and security in the wider Asia Pacific region and reflect ASEAN's determination to move forward at a pace comfortable to all. In this regard, the ARF shall remain the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force.
9. The ASEAN Security Community is open and outward looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners to promote peace and stability in the region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation

and cooperation between ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters.

10. The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF.
11. The ASEAN Security Community shall explore enhanced cooperation with the United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
12. ASEAN shall explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building.

B. ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)

1. The ASEAN Economic Community is the realisation of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free

flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in year 2020.

2. The ASEAN Economic Community is based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN members to deepen and broaden economic integration efforts through existing and new initiatives with clear timelines.
3. The ASEAN Economic Community shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, turning the diversity that characterises the region into opportunities for business complementation making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global supply chain. ASEAN's strategy shall consist of the integration of ASEAN and enhancing ASEAN's economic competitiveness. In moving towards the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN shall, inter alia, institute new mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA); accelerate regional integration in the priority sectors; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labour and talents; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the improvement of the existing ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of any economic disputes. As a first step towards the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN

shall implement the recommendations of the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration as annexed.

4. The ASEAN Economic Community shall ensure that deepening and broadening integration of ASEAN shall be accompanied by technical and development cooperation in order to address the development divide and accelerate the economic integration of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam through IAI and RIA so that the benefits of ASEAN integration are shared and enable all ASEAN Member Countries to move forward in a unified manner.

5. The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and cooperation measures. There is a need to enhance cooperation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve, among others, human resources development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

C. ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY (ASCC)

1. The ASEAN Socio-cultural Community, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envisages a Southeast

Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of caring societies.

2. In line with the programme of action set by the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Community shall foster cooperation in social development aimed at raising the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and shall seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women, youth, and local communities.
3. ASEAN shall ensure that its work force shall be prepared for, and benefit from, economic integration by investing more resources for basic and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, and social protection. The development and enhancement of human resources is a key strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socio-economic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. ASEAN shall continue existing efforts to promote regional mobility and mutual recognition of professional credentials, talents, and skills development.
4. ASEAN shall further intensify cooperation in the area of public health, including in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, and support joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. The security of the Community is enhanced when poverty and diseases are held in check, and the peoples of ASEAN are assured of adequate health care.

5. The Community shall nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners to help preserve and promote ASEAN's diverse cultural heritage while fostering regional identity as well as cultivating people's awareness of ASEAN.
6. The Community shall intensify cooperation in addressing problems associated with population growth, unemployment, environmental degradation and transboundary pollution as well as disaster management in the region to enable individual members to fully realize their development potentials and to enhance the mutual ASEAN spirit.

We hereby pledge to our peoples our resolve and commitment to bring the ASEAN Community into reality and, for this purpose, task the concerned Ministers to implement this Declaration.

Done In Bali, Indonesia, on the Seventh Day of October in the Year Two Thousand and Three.

Appendix 5: 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration

We, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand:

FIRMLY believing the merits of regional cooperation which has drawn our countries to cooperate together in the economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian Nations;

DESIROUS of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asian Nations;

INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in affairs of States;

BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states may coexist peacefully;

RECOGNISING the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity;

DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by cooperating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

COGNIZANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension;

REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples";

AGREEING that the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization; and

CONVINCED that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being;

DO HEREBY STATE:

1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;
2. That South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

DONE at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971.

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As a region of vast geopolitical and geo-economic interest to the world, Southeast Asia continues to rise as a major region of importance. This book attempts to implement basic international relations concepts to understand and fully grasp the continued dynamics in the region and further capture and comprehend Indonesia's contemporary role in the region. It focuses on understanding how concepts such as the norm life cycle, regional and global hegemony, middle power foreign policy, regional security complex, and conflict management can be effective in construing the contemporary dynamics in the Southeast Asian region. It starts by contextualizing the historical aspect of the Southeast Asian region identity, followed by the process of extra-regional forums under the authority of ASEAN. And continues by highlighting the the great power contestation and the involvement of middle powers to the Southeast Asian region. It then concludes by elaborating the issue of the South China Seas and human security, as well as how ASEAN responded to them.

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